

MARINE CORPS Gazette



NOVEMBER, 1946

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THIS MONTH'S COVER

LIKE frosting for a birthday cake, the cover for the anniversary issue of the GAZETTE is something special. The composite effort of Mr Don Margo and Sgt Svend Andersen, both of the LEATHERNECK art staff, its symbolism really requires no explanation. To emphasize the obvious, for 171 years the Marines have been where it counts.

THE MARINE CORPS GAZETTE

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PASSING IN REVIEW

BOOKS OF INTEREST
TO MARINE READERS

Cargo Ship . . .

MISTER ROBERTS—Thomas Heggen. Illustrated by Samuel Hanks Bryant. 221 pages. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co. \$2.50.

Mister Roberts is one of the first and best samples of good writing to come out of the recent war. Anyone who ever traveled on a transport in the Pacific will be aware of the realism in Heggen's book. He tells of life aboard the *USS Reluctant*, a Navy cargo ship making its regular run from Tedium to Boredom and sometimes to Monotony and even Ennui, 3,000 miles away. In its months of plodding across the Pacific the ship is never fired upon. Its own 5-inch gun (and the port 3-inchers) were fired on only one occasion—for five frantic, erratic minutes at a periscope which proved to be a branch of a floating tree.

Against this background of monotonous peace is highlighted the story of the ship's first lieutenant, Douglas Roberts, Lt, USNR, "a young man of sensitivity, perceptiveness, and idealism." At 18 he had enlisted in the Abraham Lincoln Brigade but the war ended before he could get to Spain. In 1940 he tried to get in the RAF in Canada and in 1941 applied to the American air forces, failing because of a malocclusion. When war came to Pearl Harbor, Roberts left medical school and joined the Navy, eager to get into action. By 1945 he has been 33 months out of the States on the *Reluctant* and prior to that he served peacefully on a tanker in the Atlantic. On the 15th day of every month he submits a letter requesting combat duty on a destroyer or a cruiser. Finally re-assigned, he is killed by a kamikaze blast while drinking coffee in the wardroom of a destroyer off Kyushu.

That story will not sound like much to marines, notably lacking in sympathy for the hard lot of the Navy with its sheets, showers, hot chow, and ice water. But Heggen can write and his book is full of real Navy people. He is not so preoccupied with Mr. Roberts' baffled fighting spirit as to neglect the men and the life aboard

his ship. The lack of incentive in a dull and thankless task, with its resultant missing morale and discipline, has its varied effect on all hands aboard the *Reluctant*. Never seeing a Jap, these 180-odd officers and men had only one tangible enemy—the Captain. The warfare that went on was ridiculous, even pathetic perhaps, but it served as a substitute for the shooting war they missed.

The crew of the *Reluctant*, their actions and their talk, are realistic, but Heggen achieves his effect without the overworked vulgarity of some recent war novels. His account of the island nurses taking showers within view of the ship's signal bridge is a small masterpiece in itself. The same might be said of the book as a whole; unpretentious, it nevertheless covers a lot of issues without fumbling and remains highly readable. It might well be required reading, along with the advice of John Paul Jones, for newly-commissioned officers of any service.

This is Thomas Heggen's first book. He spent four years in the Navy and came out a lieutenant, after serving on an APA that was on hand at Guam, Peleliu, Iwo, and Okinawa. An account of life on an assault transport prior to a landing operation would make interesting reading if it came from his typewriter. In *Mister Roberts* he already has done a fine job on one aspect of the recent Pacific war. LM

Japanese Story . . .

THE LOST WAR—Matsuo Kato. 264 pages. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. \$2.75.

This book, say the publishers, was written in a freezing building in bombed-out Tokyo last winter by Matsuo Kato, one-time Domei correspondent with the assistance of Capt John W. Henderson, AUS, of Washington, D. C. It is the summing-up of what went on inside of Japan during the Pacific War—written for American consumption by a Japanese.

Kato lists as basic reasons for the war: ". . . Japan's long-range dreams of expansion, of access to raw materials to relieve the pressure of population, underlay a complex combination of diplomatic, political, and military miscalculations . . . German influence, the pre-occupation of Russia, racial antipathies, fear and distrust of the Western powers, the personal ambition of Japan's leaders, and the insistence of the military upon regaining the face that had been lost in the ill-conceived, ill-executed China incident . . ."

The Japanese decision to attack the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands was based on the Army's best judgment and was a "now-or-never proposition."

Meanwhile, in Washington, Nomura and Kurosu were dickering with the State Department.

Mister Roberts

by Thomas Heggen

The story of men aboard a Navy cargo ship doing monotonous duty in the Pacific. Their actions, their realistic talk, and their feud with the captain, as written by a former lieutenant in the U. S. Navy, help make this one of the top novels of the war.

\$2.50

THE LOST WAR

by Matsuo Kato

Here is the summing up of what went on in Japan during the war behind the iron curtain of censorship. Written objectively by a former Domei correspondent who once studied and worked in the United States.

\$2.75

GAZETTE BOOKSHOP Order Blank
on page 62

Adm Kichisaburo Nomura is pictured as a bluff and sincere sailor and Saburo Kurusu is supposed to have wondered himself if he were being used as a smokescreen.

Japan was on a full war footing by the time Kurusu reached Washington, although only a few of the top leaders knew how advanced the plans were. Japan did not contemplate an invasion of either Hawaii or the mainland; the Pearl Harbor attack was planned to bring the U. S. naval strength below that of the Japanese fleet. Japan's over-all strategy was to become so firmly established in the South Pacific that with the anticipated German victory in Europe, the U. S. would abandon the war in the Pacific as a useless expense.

Orders were issued on 1 December by the Imperial headquarters to start the war at 1:30 p.m., 7 December (New York Time), just 30 minutes after Kurusu and Nomura were to deliver the Japanese reply to Cordell Hull's brusque note of 26 November. But the Japanese diplomatic duo were an hour and 20 minutes late in getting to the State Department. Supposedly, they didn't know the attack had begun and they couldn't understand Hull's strained attitude. It wasn't until they returned to the Embassy that an attache told them of the radio reports of the bombing of Pearl Harbor—or so at least claims Kato who was in Washington at the time.

After being exchanged, Kato arrived home on 13 August 1942 to find a Japan flushed with victory. The government was already dividing its new ready-made colonial empire among the great Zaibatsu firms (Mitsui, Mitsubishi, etc.) for exploitation. Even the naval defeats of Midway and the Coral Sea had been adroitly presented as victories.

But behind Japan's outward facade of unity there was friction between the Army and the Navy, particularly over the allocation of air-equally. When things got tough, the Navy declared the Central Pacific the critical area and wanted to concentrate Japan's total air power there. The Army was insistent that its Burma and Chinese campaigns were equally important.

The loss of Saipan was recognized, even in Japan, as the beginning of the end. Tojo resigned 20 July 1944 and a new cabinet was formed with Gen Kuniaki Koiso as premier. The Koiso government faltered along for a year, then collapsed on 5 April 1945 with the American landings on Okinawa. The war was getting too close to Japan. The formation of the Suzuki government, at the direct instigation of the Emperor, was a bid for peace.

Kato discloses that, in the early days of the war, our radio and pamphlet propaganda was as amusing and ridiculous to the Japanese as were their similar efforts to us. Our radio commenta-

tors used archaic Japanese and our illustrators botched the Jap national costume and customs. The best propaganda agent the Americans had was the B-29.

He admits that the atomic bomb was only a *coup de grace* to a nation already in its death throes.

"At the moment the bomb struck, Japan's war was irrevocably lost, along with her fantastic dream of empire, her adolescent longing for world recognition, and her militarists' inflamed lust for power. . . ."

Japan's basic economy was much too shaky to support a major war. In the fall of 1941 she had just enough oil to wage war if she were going to wage it at all. Once her reserves were exhausted, she was depending on the captured fields and refineries of the Netherlands East Indies, but the battered merchant marine couldn't deliver the goods. Japan's steel industry, one-twentieth that of the U. S., failed for lack of scrap (once imported principally from the U. S.) and shortage of high grade coal (the merchant marine couldn't deliver from Manchuria and North China).

About 80 cities had been completely destroyed or mostly reduced to rubble. Tokyo had become a collection of small villages with about a third of its 1940 population of 6.8 million.

From a prewar level of 2,400 calories, Japan's diet fell to 1,500 calories. The black market got out of control, gained a semi-authorized status.

Even so the people were stunned when Hirohito gave them the word they were through. Among the Army extremists there were riots. Radio Tokyo was briefly seized. More than a thousand officers and professional soldiers killed themselves before August was ended. But the majority of the people accepted the war's end fatalistically.

Kato's book deserves a reading. It is a well-balanced piece of reporting, and it gives, much more impartially than you would expect, the story of what went on inside Japan. EHS



Global Air War . . .

THE BRERETON DIARIES—LtGen Lewis H. Brereton, USA, 450 pages, New York: William Morrow & Co. \$4.00.

Gen Brereton's experiences in World War II as an air force commander may be described as global. He was in the Philippines when war broke out, moved to Australia and then to the China-Burma-India Theatre. From India he went to North Africa and formed the Ninth Air Force, which he later took to England to become the nucleus of the U. S. Tactical Air Force. When Germany collapsed, he was the commander of the First Allied Airborne Army.

Graduating from the U. S. Naval Academy in

The Brereton Diaries

by LtGen Lewis H. Brereton

The commander of the Ninth Army Air Force and First Allied Airborne Army tells of his setbacks and victories in the past war. From the fall of the Philippines and the retreat in Burma to victory in Africa and Europe, the general presents the story of global war as he saw it.

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1911, Lewis H. Brereton transferred to the Army and joined the Signal Corps in order to get into aviation. He served with distinction in World War I, and was commanding the Third Air Force in Florida when ordered to the Philippines in October 1941.

As commander of the American Air Forces in the Philippines shortly after the Japanese attack, Gen Brereton was placed in an unenviable position. Insufficient planes, lack of air warning services, and construction difficulties were only a portion of the obstacles he had to surmount. The general states that after the Japanese attack on 8 December, he wanted to bomb Formosa, but was forbidden, for reasons never fully explained.

Just prior to the evacuation of Manila, Gen Brereton was transferred to Australia to aid in the defense of the Australia, British, Dutch, American Command known as ABDACOM. The fight for Java is a depressing tale which might have ended differently, according to the general, if there had been time for him to receive the planes already en route to ABDACOM from the United States.

Upon the fall of Java, Brereton was ordered to India to help in the defense of India, Burma, and Chungking. At this point it is apparent that Gen Brereton is fed up with evacuating areas one jump ahead of the Japs. Nevertheless, he

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


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set to work and arranged for the resupply of Stillwell's forces and managed to take the offensive by organizing, and participating in bombing attacks against Port Blair and Rangoon.

The gravity of the Allied position in the Middle East called for Gen Brereton's presence at Cairo. With available bombers from India, he arrived at Cairo just as Rommel had driven Auchinleck back into Egypt, and was on the point of entering Alexandria. Here the fortunes of war change and he has the satisfaction of seeing the renowned *Afrika Korps* disintegrate and fall back hurriedly, largely due to Allied air superiority.

While in the Middle East, Gen Brereton directed the Ploesti raid of August 1, 1943. He says our planes achieved "approximately a 60 per cent destruction and put a serious dent in Germany's oil supply." (This estimate varies from that of the Strategic Bombing Survey which states that in the year following Ploesti, oil deliveries to Germany increased.)

Another of Gen Brereton's proudest recollections of the Middle East is the forced surrender of Pantelleria, Leros, and Lampedusa by bombardment aviation unaided by other forces.

England is the next port of call for the general, where his Ninth Air Force was retrained to take a part in the coming invasion of Europe. Here the Ninth grew to be the world's largest air force. Their mission was tactical, and history has recorded its effectiveness.

Perhaps the most significant of Gen Brereton's undertakings was the formation of the First Allied Airborne Army in August 1944—a task the general was at first reluctant to accept. Gen Eisenhower was deeply interested in its organization, while Montgomery never fully supported the idea. In the big operation of Arnhem, the airborne troops accomplished their mission but the Second Army's failure to break through made it impossible to capitalize on the original success. After the Arnhem drop, Montgomery refused to release the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions, and used them as conventional infantry in spite of Gen Brereton's loud protests.

Reinforcing his opinions with Gen Arnold's, the author makes no bones as to the Air Force feeling regarding the controversy in the Army about airborne command. Airborne troops, Gen Brereton believes, should be commanded by Air Force officers.

In the diaries, Gen Brereton does not make a plea for air power, nor does he speculate on the future of the air arm. Yet, he tells us that he was on Gen "Billy" Mitchell's defense staff, and repeatedly refers to Mitchell's theories as they were applied in this war. One suspects that, given an opportunity to set down his ideas in other than diary form, Gen Brereton would be all out for air power.

EGR

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This Month and Next

FLETCHER PRATT dropped in the other day to tell us that his publishers have titled his history (currently running in the GAZETTE as "The Marines in the Pacific War) "THE LONG ROAD: the Marines in the Pacific." The book is scheduled for release sometime next spring.

CAPT LEWIS MEYERS, who will shortly leave Quantico for inactive duty and California, comes through this month with "The Over-Rated Bayonet" which is one of the most revealing articles we have yet printed. Capt Meyers, incidentally, had one of the war's shortest careers as a rifle company commander. A company officer on Iwo when his CO was hit, Meyers got up, managed to take two steps before he too went down.

Next month there will be "Keeping Up with Amphibious Warfare" by MAJ JOHN S. HUDSON which summarizes the mission of the Atlantic and Pacific Fleet Troop Training Units, and "Defense Against Airborne Attack" by LTCOL ROBERT E. CUSHMAN, whose tactical discourses have appeared before in the GAZETTE.

Also scheduled for December is a piece on the latest developments in automatic arms by CAPT MELVIN M. JOHNSON, JR., who knows more about the subject than anybody we can think of; his books on small arms are standard texts and his light machine gun and automatic rifle designs are justly famous.

Anniversary Greetings ... from the Commandant

ON THIS 171st anniversary of the U. S. Marine Corps I have a special greeting and challenge to the officers and non-commissioned officers who have chosen a career in the postwar military establishment. One of the reasons you have chosen that career is that you are proud of the record of our Corps, and of being a part of it, just as I am.



In 171 years our Corps has an amazing record which will bear the closest scrutiny. Its traditions have been upheld in every generation by marines who did more than their duty at all times. On this anniversary we have virtually a new organization. Never in peacetime has the Marine Corps approached its present size, while even during the first World War it was only slightly more than half as large as it is today. In the last two months approximately as many men joined the Marine Corps as composed its entire force during the early 1930's, when the nation mistakenly abandoned its defenses for treaties that were to become scraps of paper.

These new men will hear, just as you have heard in years past, of the spectacular feats of arms performed by a few marines at Tripoli and the Halls of Montezuma. They will hear, at first hand, of the gallantry of marines at Belleau Wood, Guadalcanal, and Iwo Jima. In the long years in which the Marine Corps has served the nation these battles rightly have special significance.

At the same time, other contributions which were equally vital were made during the years when the world was technically at peace. The task which the Corps now faces is to equal or surpass these accomplishments in the coming years, which we can help to make years of peace.

It is a part of our history which we can well consider today that between 1812 and 1917 marines made 108 separate landings in every part of the globe. Moreover, each of these landings was so efficiently accomplished as to win the commendation of the naval officer in command. Never was a Marine landing force ambushed or driven back, and never did the Marines fail to accomplish their mission.

The phrase "First to Fight" is no empty one, although a study of Marine operations shows that quick, decisive action has many times averted the necessity for actual hostilities. It is axiomatic that the Marine Corps is always ready for action with the Fleet in any part of the world. How that reputation was won is well worth the serious study of any professional military man. In 1836 the Commandant of the Corps mobilized even the clerks in Head-

quarters and led more than half the strength of the Corps in action against an Indian uprising. The rapid movement of marines to capture Guantanamo Bay in the Spanish-American War and their bold and skillful performance of duty led Admiral Dewey to remark that if he had had a thousand marines at Manila he could have averted the bloody Philippine Insurrection. Again in 1902 a battalion of marines was embarked for Panama within 24 hours of receipt of orders, and its presence halted a rebellion which was under way.


That state of readiness which is and must continue to be standard for the Marine Corps made possible the speedy garrisoning of Iceland in 1941 and it allowed the United States to take the offensive at Guadalcanal. The Marines were not ready by accident, but rather by plan, in accord with the doctrines of employment of amphibious forces which the Navy and Marine Corps have worked out in their 171 years of close association. The Fleet Marine Force was the test of these amphibious doctrines which were adopted by all the major nations.

The Presidential Unit Citations won by Marine units in the Pacific testify to more than individual courage and "esprit de corps." They demonstrate knowledge, skill, attention to details, and above all, devotion to duty, all of which go to make up an efficient fighting team. These are the qualities which every leader must have and which he must impart to the men around him.

A military career is an honorable one and I take pleasure in welcoming into our ranks the thousands of officers and non-commissioned officers who have lately chosen it. It is not an easy life, because it is a position of trust, and as such calls for continuous effort. There is more which you must learn today than ever before in military history. The developments of the future which are now casting their shadows among us merit the closest attention and study. Equally important is familiarity with the past achievements of our Corps. Tactics and techniques change, although their basic principles remain the same. Devotion to duty never changes. In the year ahead we can well take inspiration and guidance from the marines who have freely hazarded and offered their lives in the cause of the United States. We can draw equal inspiration from the generations of marines who have quietly stood guard over our liberties for 171 years. Years of hard work in keeping the peace are as much a part of our tradition as battles and beachheads.

It is our job to be ready for anything which may be required of us, and it is our tradition that we will be ready at any time. That is one of the many cherished traditions which it is our privilege and our challenge to maintain during the coming year. I know that each of you will meet the challenge squarely, just as marines have done ever since November 10, 1775, in peace as well as war.





THE FOURTH MARINES AT CORREGIDOR

CORREGIDOR and Bataan will forever be, in American memory, synonymous with painful pride—pain in the worst defeat ever inflicted upon American arms, pride in the courage of the men who fought and died in the jungles of the Philippines.

To most Americans the First Philippine Campaign is inextricably linked with the names of MacArthur and Wainwright and with the traditions and the valor of the United States Army. But few know of the major role played in that campaign—particularly in the defense of Corregidor—by the 4th Regiment of the United States Marine Corps.

The 4th Marines, “old China hands” of the prewar years, was responsible for all of the beach defenses of Corregidor, and some of its men fought on the other tiny fortified islands in the entrance to Manila Bay and on Bataan in those opening actions, four and a half years ago, of the greatest war in history. The story of the Fourth never has been fully told, indeed may never be, for two-thirds of its officers, most of its men, died as Japanese prisoners of war or were killed in action on “The Rock.” This, then, is the story of the Fourth, gathered from returned prisoners of war and official Marine Corps records, an incomplete story but one which will forever form an imperishable chapter of the Corps.

The 4th Marines, organized in 1914 for duty in Mexico by then Col Joseph H. Pendleton, was assigned to Shanghai in 1927 after eight years service in Santo Domingo. It was as well known to the international community in Shanghai as the Bund itself, and for all those troubled years during the Japanese aggressions in China it was a stabilizing influence in a community where death and disorder were commonplace. The men of the Fourth were no strangers to war; they had witnessed the Chapei fighting and had seen bloated corpses floating in Soochow Creek; in the last months before the storm broke, they

By Hanson W. Baldwin

had learned—by firm measures—to cope with a series of Japanese incidents, deliberately manufactured provocations and aggressions.


But it was clear as 1941 drew to its end that war was imminent and that the 4th Marines in Shanghai and the “Legation Guard” in Peiping and Tientsin¹ would be cut off and captured unless withdrawn from a China already dominated by Japan. On 28 November the Regiment marched with its “music” down Bubbling Well Road—the drums rolling and the thousands cheering—to the docks.

With the Regiment—commanded by Col (now MajGen) Samuel L. Howard—went the praise of the International Settlement for a job well done:

“... the Fourth Marines (American Consul E. F. Stanton wrote) have been a stabilizing influence in the International Settlement and have been of the utmost assistance to the Shanghai Municipal Council in the maintenance of law and order and the handling of many complicated problems which have arisen from time to time.”

“The tact, the resourcefulness, the efficiency and the devotion to duty, always displayed by the Fourth Marines, and their success in contributing toward the preservation of peace and

¹The “North China” Marines, scheduled to pull out of China shortly after the Fourth, were actually cut off and captured by the Japanese. The Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, endorsing the recommendation of all Marine and Naval COs in China and the American Consul General at Shanghai, had recommended to the Navy Department as early as September, 1941, that all Marine and Naval units be withdrawn. He was told by the Navy Department that a “meeting was to be held at the State Department on the subject in about two weeks.” But the Japanese troop movements in Asia were plainly threatening; the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, reiterated his recommendation, “stating that it was not a question which could be delayed for weeks but must be acted upon immediately.” But final action came too late to save the “North China” Marines. Sixteen officers and warrant officers and 178 enlisted men in these detachments were captured. The *SS President Harrison*, which took part of the Fourth to the Philippines started back to pick up the “North China” detachments but war came too soon; she was captured off Chinwangtao by Japanese destroyers.



Philippine defenses were pitifully inadequate. Hastily contrived tank traps failed to halt the Japanese advance.

order here, will always . . . be remembered with sincere gratitude . . . and will constitute a fine record of achievement in the Regiment's annals."

(Poul Scheel, *Consul General for Denmark and Senior Consul*).

It was a fitting send-off for a proud Regiment—that march to the docks, but it was the end of the “best duty in the world” for the old “Chinahands,” and many of the marines were sad-faced and sombre and the White Russian girls and the little Chinese beauties came out of the cafes and nightclubs and wept. And the waving flags and drumming music could not hide the sense of impending doom; just before the marines left their Shanghai billets for the last time, a Chinese surreptitiously took a letter out of his sleeve and handed it to a sentry. It read:

“Me and my brother work for Japanese military. They are planning to sink your ships. . . .”

THE Japanese in Shanghai did all they could—short of the use of force—to delay the Fourth’s departure. Garden Bridge over Soochow Creek was closed to traffic; Chinese customs authorities at Japanese instigation demanded that all the Marines’ supplies pass through customs, and coolies loading the lighters struck three times during one night. But CinC, Asiatic, saw the storm gathering and ordered the evacuation expedited.

The 2d Bn plus half of the Headquarters and Service Co and half of the regimental hospital embarked aboard the *SS President Madison* on 27 November, and sailed at 1600. The next day the remainder of the Regiment, and a large number of civilian refugees, including women and children, boarded the *SS President Harrison*—

the conversion of which to troop use had not been completed—and sailed at 1400 as thousands of Chinese, waving Chinese and American flags, lined the shores of the river. Embarked on the two ships, bound for the Philippines, were about 766 marines (the strength of the Regiment purposely had been allowed to drop during its last year in Shanghai).² Left behind, attached to the American Consulate, to pay bills and terminate leases were LtCol (then QM Clerk) Paul G. Chandler and two clerks. It was the end of an era in China.

The trip to the Philippines, despite threats and alarms, was largely un-

eventful. Marine radio operators took over the ships’ sets and copied down the chattering, uneasy news of a world on the edge of catastrophe. Jap destroyers steamed menacingly close and followed the transports for a short time. Japanese planes flew over and around the ships. Thirty caliber machine guns were mounted for AA defense and the liners were blacked out at night. Jap freighters, northbound, changed course to pass close aboard. Two American submarines picked up the liners on the 29th and escorted them southward, as storm clouds piled up in the Orient.

The Regiment arrived at Olongapo, naval station on Subic Bay on Luzon, on 30 November and 1 December 1941. “Two lighter loads of supplies were taken off each ship on the morning of arrival; remaining supplies were taken to Manila and were trucked back to Olongapo.” The Regiment went into billets—temporary wooden barracks, half-completed—and under canvas. Col Howard, after a trip to Manila, was informed the Regiment was needed to guard the naval stations on Luzon, particularly the new section base at Mariveles. The “CO” commenced to make his dispositions but they were never completed. At about 0400, 8 December, the Regiment heard the stirring notes of the “Call to Arms” and learned of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.

The Regiment immediately absorbed the Barracks Detachment of the Naval Station, Olongapo; a third platoon was organized for

²When it left Shanghai, the Fourth consisted of only two battalions and each battalion consisted of only one machine gun company and two rifle companies, each of which had but two platoons. There was also a Headquarters and Service Co. Naval medical personnel were attached.

each rifle company; Cos C and G organized, and the regimental band transformed into a rifle platoon. The 1st Bn moved to Mariveles to guard that base and help unload naval supplies. Around Olongapo foxholes were dug, wire strung, road blocks established, AA guns set up, beach defenses of Subic Bay commenced and terrain reconnaissance started. After 9 December only two meals a day were served—"breakfast before daylight and dinner after dark," and the blackout was strictly enforced.

It was well, for the Regiment got its baptism of fire at Olongapo and Mariveles. On 12 December Jap fighter planes destroyed seven PBYs—sitting ducks in the harbor—and on 13 December the Naval station was bombed; 13 civilians were killed and 40 wounded in the town of Olongapo, and the Regiment's field hospital, a mile out of town and plainly marked with red crosses, was straddled. The hospital was shifted to a well-concealed area in the hills, and the Tokyo radio announced that the 4th Marines had been "annihilated."

The Marines' antiaircraft defenses of Olongapo, consisted—in those first raids—of only a few .30 caliber Brownings, but everyone fired everything they had whenever the Jap planes dived and strafed. In one raid, Capt (then QM Clerk) Frank W. Ferguson recalls, two marines with BARs had a position of vantage atop the station water tower.

Those weeks of December 1941 were days of intensive rumor, back-breaking toil on foxholes and defenses; and constant alterations of orders and missions as the Japanese forces landed on Luzon and pressed toward Manila. Wires to the naval station at Olongapo were cut by saboteurs and all Japanese civilians in the Olongapo area were rounded up and turned over to the Army provost marshal in Manila.

There were intermittent bombings of the area as Christmas drew near, and the Regiment suffered its first dead—two marines killed and several wounded—when a Jap bomb struck the French ship *Sikiang* which was anchored off Mariveles.

Shortly before Christmas, Gen Douglas MacArthur, commanding all U. S. Army Forces in the Far East, requested Adm Thomas C. Hart, commanding the Asiatic Fleet, to transfer the "powerful, veteran 4th Marines" to his command, and on Christmas Eve, when Col "Sam"



Optimistic newscasts from the States depressed the defenders, made them wonder if America knew how one-sided odds were.

Howard reported at Navy headquarters in Manila, he was told that the Fourth had been transferred to Army Command for "such tactical control and employment as he (Gen MacArthur) may desire in the defense of Luzon." Col Howard quickly found out on that sad Christmas Eve that the whole structure of American power in the Orient was falling to bits under Japan's sledgehammer blows. Manila was being evacuated; Gen MacArthur was transferring his headquarters to Corregidor; Adm Hart was leaving by submarine; on all fronts the mixed American-Filipino forces were falling back toward Bataan.

Col Howard reported to Gen MacArthur for duty. "He was very cordial," Howard noted later, "and directed that I report to his chief of staff, Gen Sutherland, for orders. On reporting to Gen Sutherland he directed the 4th Marines proceed to Corregidor and take over the beach defenses of that island."

"I told him (Howard continues) of my reconnaissance of Bataan and suggested that the 4th Marines might first be employed advantageously in defending the beaches from Bagac Bay to Mariveles until such time as other troops could be made available for this purpose. He replied that he wanted the 4th Marines to take over the beach defenses of Corregidor as soon as practicable."

The move southward started, and as the last echelons of the Regiment moved toward Mariveles, Col Howard received orders on Christmas morning to expedite the destruction of the Olongapo Naval Station and to retire into Bataan. Fort Wint on Subic Bay was being evacuated; the 45th Infantry, Philippine Scouts, and the 31st Division, Philippine Army, had

been pulled back into Bataan, and Co F and a small motor transport and QM detachment of the 4th Marines were the last organized American force on Luzon west of Zambales mountains and north of Bataan.

On 26 December the last of the Fourth pulled out, but it left behind at Olongapo flaming ruins, testimonials to the demolition capabilities of Maj (then Capt) Francis H. (Joe) Williams. The obsolete armored cruiser *New York* with a proud record from another war, which had been used as a station ship at Olongapo, was towed into the deep-water channel in Subic Bay and her bottom blown out with depth charges; the concrete patrol plane ramp was blown up; stocks of gasoline and oil were destroyed and all buildings and equipment that could not be evacuated were burned or destroyed.

The Marines moved back to Mariveles and, then, in three increments, on three successive nights, 27 to 29 December, the Regiment, with attached personnel—"six months' rations for 2,000 men, over ten units of fire for all weapons, two years' supply of summer clothing, and medicines and equipment for a 100-bed hospital" shifted across the channel to Corregidor, the famed but ill-named "Gibraltar of the East."

That old song of the China station was prophetic. . . .

"Oh, we won't go back to Subic anymore. . . ."

THE Japanese plan for conquest of the Philippines was well thought out, but at least in its land phases not always brilliantly executed. But it opposed strength to weakness—and the Japs knew it. For years our "Orange" war plans had envisaged withdrawal into Bataan and the fortified islands at the entrance to Manila Bay; yet in December 1941 there were not even field fortifications on Bataan; the section naval base at Mariveles was far from finished; and although the Philippines lie close to the greatest quinine producing area in the world, there was a grossly inadequate supply of that drug in the Army's stores on Luzon.

To the Japs, Malaya and Singapore were the No. 1 objectives, but the Philippines were secondary only to these goals. The enemy was

²Our own high authorities were similarly, though self-deluded. In November, top ranking officials of the War Department told American newspapermen that the greatest concentration of "Flying Fortresses" (35) in the world was then massed in the Philippines, and that by early Spring of 1942, we would have enough planes there (nearly 200 heavy bombers) and enough reinforcements in ground troops to insure satisfactory defense of the islands. This concept—in the light of history, obviously absurd—was clearly based upon a false premise. It did not define air power in broad enough terms; it did not consider that air power means far more than planes alone, and that radar, AA guns, landing fields, ground crews, ground troops, etc., are essential. Nor did it recognize the prime function of sea

somewhat alarmed by the slow build-up of American air strength³; they had been informed that the United States had 900 planes in the islands, but a Jap photo-reconnaissance plane—apparently flying at such height that it was never detected—really won the Philippine campaign for Japan in the late days of November before a shot was fired. The enemy plane photographed carefully and spotted our principal plane concentrations in the islands, and as a result the Japanese revised their estimates of our air strength downward to 300 planes and made careful plans for destroying them on the ground in early morning 8 December (7 December, Pearl Harbor time). Bad weather intervened, and the first actual bombing attacks were made between noon and 1300. But 172 planes, all long-range naval planes based on Formosa, participated and

the result was still the same—surprise, and unprecedented execution among our "sitting ducks." Other determined raids, from Formosa, even-

tually bolstered by short-range Jap Army planes based at Aparri, Batan Island (off northern Luzon) and other landing fields captured in the first invasions, quickly followed up the enemy's initial advantage. Within a week American air power in the Philippines had been almost destroyed, at a cost to the Japanese of some 30 planes; the remnants of our heavy bombers were fleeing south, and from then until the end, the American forces fought virtually without "eyes."

Land invasions quickly followed the air blows. Orders for the invasion had reached LtGen Masaharu Homma on Formosa on 20 November 1941, eighteen days before Pearl Harbor, but Japanese Formosan forces had actually commenced training for the invasion in March 1941.

The Japanese Second Fleet, under ViceAdm Kondo, earmarked for support of the Southwestern Pacific operations, rendezvoused in the Inland Sea about the middle of November, sortied on the 23rd, and proceeded to Formosa where it received word of D-Day. This fleet (fleet organization in the Japanese Navy was flexible and strengths varied greatly) originally consisted of the battleships *Haruna* and *Kongo*, and the heavy cruisers *Takao*, *Atago*, *Chokai*, and *Maya*, but it was reenforced for the operation by other cruisers and light vessels. The main

power in a Pacific war; no matter how strong the Philippines were in 1941-42, they must—sooner or later—have fallen, for American sea power was not then strong enough to keep open the supply lines from this country to the Philippines—lines which alone could nourish and sustain our isolated land and air forces there. In retrospect it is fortunate that no such misguided effort was then made, for a naval attempt to smash through the Japanese island screen and the Japanese Fleet to the Philippines would probably have ended—in 1941-42—in a disaster to us even greater than Pearl Harbor.


body, which acted only in general support, consisted of the two battleships, two heavy cruisers, and four destroyers.

The Philippine Island group, divided into four task forces for close support, transport protection, and other duties, consisted of six heavy cruisers, three light cruisers, 46 destroyers, and auxiliary vessels. The Eleventh Air Fleet (Naval), with headquarters in Takao, Formosa, supported the Philippine operation with about 300 planes, land-based on Formosa. About 150 Japanese Army planes, based on Formosa, also supported the Philippine operations, but until air bases in the Philippines were seized, the range of the Army planes did not permit them to operate over Central Luzon or the Manila-Bataan area. After the invasion, Army air units from Formosa moved to Laoag and Vigan, but the fields were unusable and the Jap planes subsequently based on captured Clark and Nichols Fields.

Jap plans for the Philippine Campaign contemplated sudden attacks, swift destruction of American air power, and multiple landings on Luzon and in the Davao area of Mindanao, with the main landings in the Lingayen Gulf and Lamon Bay areas.

The Jap Third Fleet, which consisted of the actual transports, supply ships (about 60 in number), minesweepers, invasion forces, and supporting naval craft (cruisers, destroyers, and submarines) with the heavy cruiser *Ashigara* as flagship, was based on Formosa and Palau. That section of it which conducted the northwest invasions of Luzon, sortied from Formosa early 10 December and made their first landing at Aparri the same day. Another landing at Vigan quickly followed. There was virtually no opposition, except sporadic attacks by a few American planes, which cost the Aparri force one sub-chaser and one transport sunk.

The United States quickly claimed that Capt Colin P. Kelly, Jr. in a B-17 bomber had sunk the Japanese battleship *Haruna* and Kelly was subsequently awarded posthumously a Distinguished Service Cross. But the *Haruna*, actually sunk three years later at the war's end at Kure, Japan, was not even attacked; she was in the support force of the Second Fleet far from the Philippine coastline. Kelly may have bombed



Hospitals on Bataan were little more than lean-tos. Facilities on Corregidor were better but medical supplies just as scarce.

the heavy cruiser *Ashigara*, but she was not damaged.

Forces from Palau conducted the invasions of southeastern Luzon (the Japs landed at Legaspi on 11 December) and of Mindanao, and on 22 December, one of the largest Japanese landings took place, as expected, at Lingayen Gulf.

But by then American forces, woefully inadequate in number, equipment, and training for defense of the vast Luzon coastline, were hopelessly split and dispersed. Many of the Jap landing places had been anticipated but the number of them and their timing—and the pincer move of the enemy from north and south—put the small American forces in a hopeless strategic position. This was particularly true since the defense of the Philippines had been based primarily upon the Philippine Army, which was large on paper but short on quality. Most of its men had had only five and a half months training; most of its units were still being mobilized when the Jap attacks came; officers were insufficient in number and quality; equipment was lacking; and the Philippine idea of discipline was rudimentary. Most of the Jap landings were virtually unopposed and many of the Filipino "divisions" from which so much had been hoped, virtually melted away into the hills (some of them to become guerrillas, most to return to their homes) soon after the first shots were fired.

So, sooner than had been expected, Manila was declared an open city and evacuated, and the forces of the United States pulled back into the jungles of Bataan and the water-girt fortresses in the mouth of Manila Bay.

With the 4th Marines' shift to Corregidor, the Regiment absorbed another Philippine Marine unit—the 1st Separate Bn—which already had been bathed in fire during the Japanese bombing of Cavite Navy Yard on 11 December, and in a subsequent Jap air attack on 19 December, on the Sangley Point air station. The 1st Separate Bn from Cavite, became on Corregidor, the 3d Bn, 4th Marines thus increasing the strength of the Regiment to 65 officers, 7 warrants and 1,490 enlisted men.

Several small Marine detachments — the strength of which varied from time to time—remained on Bataan, but were attached for purposes of administration to the Regiment. Btrys A and C—about 8 officers and 226 Marines, 3-inch AA, originally part of the Cavite detachment—were incorporated in the AA defense of Bataan and performed various other duties, despite a pitiful shortage of guns and equipment. Btry A, under 1stLt William F. Hogaboom, served for a time as guard for Ordnance Headquarters on Bataan⁴, and, when relieved later by a detachment from the 2d Bn on Corregidor (1stLt Ralph C. Mann, Jr., commanding) Btry A joined the special Naval battalion on Bataan, manned AA guns, trained naval personnel and served as the experience cadre of the makeshift outfit. Btry A participated with the Naval Bn, and mortar and machine gun sections from Cos D and H, 4th Marines (the latter specially sent over from Corregidor), in the small scale but bitter actions in late January to wipe out Japanese landing parties which had pushed ashore behind our lines at Lapiay and Longoskawayan Points. This battery remained on Bataan until mid-February, when part of its personnel was transferred to Btry C as replacements, and the rest went to Corregidor to bolster the Regiment. Btry C remained on Bataan until the end, when most of its personnel escaped to Corregidor. Lt Mann's Army headquarters guard of two officers and 40 marines was cut off and captured when Bataan surrendered.

In addition to these forces, a Marine Detachment, Air Raid Warning Service, consisting of 32 enlisted marines, one Navy hospital corpsman, one Filipino cook—all under Lt Lester A. Schade and Marine Gunner John T. Brainard operated a Navy radio transmitter and receiver all over Bataan peninsula from soon after the beginning of the war until the end on Bataan on 9 April 1942. This small detachment, from which nine men escaped to Corregidor at the time of Bataan's surrender, was under bombardment from planes and artillery frequently but kept in action until the last and then destroyed its equipment.

⁴This battery received a letter of commendation by order of Gen MacArthur for smart performance of duty in this post. For more detail see *Action Report: BATAAN* by 1stLt William F. Hogaboom in the April '46 Gazette.

In addition to manning the beach defenses of Corregidor and bolstering the defense of Bataan, the Marines also furnished men for many odd military "job-lots" in and around the fortified islands in the mouth of Manila Bay. By direction of MajGen G. F. Moore, commanding the coast defense posts on the fortified islands, the following details were assigned to the Marines:

Corregidor:

Btry Indiana—four .50 caliber AA machine guns, Lt James W. Keene and 38 enlisted men, operating under Col Chase, CAC, commanding AA defense of Corregidor.

Fort Drum (the so-called "concrete battleship" on El Fraile Island, a sub-post of Corregidor)—two .50 caliber AA machine guns and 14 enlisted men.

Fort Hughes (on Caballo Island)—Eight .30 caliber machine guns; four .50 caliber machine guns; Lt Frederic N. Hagan, Jr., Lt Julian V. Lyon and 83 enlisted men, in charge, initially, of the beach defenses of Fort Hughes. Subsequently Comdr Frank Bridget, who had commanded the Naval Bn on Bataan, was appointed to command the beach defenses, with Maj Stuart W. King as his technical advisor and "exec." About 440 bluejackets and 28 naval officers were eventually added to the beach defenses and batteries of Fort Hughes.

These Marine detachments on the outlying islands were gradually increased.

Thus, the Marines in the Philippines, with the 4th Regiment as the nucleus of their tactical and administrative effort, undertook a variety of duties and fought in nearly all the areas of Luzon still in American control from December until the bitter end.

But the bulk of the Regiment was concentrated on Corregidor—"The Rock"—nerve centre of the American effort, citadel of American hopes, and the Marines were the only beach defense troops the fortress had.

It did not take the Japs long to welcome the Marines to the Rock. On those first nights in late December, the Fourth was billeted in Middle-side Barracks. Only a few hours after their arrival, the Japanese staged the first of more than 300 air raids on Corregidor. It was a heavy attack, and Middle-side Barracks were a particular target. But the Regiment was lucky. The barracks were three story structures of solid concrete construction and the bombs the Japs used were small. The marines huddled on the first floor, and most of the bombs blew through only to the second. The Japs scored four direct hits and many close misses; the barracks were pretty well wrecked, but only one man was killed—a corporal who was in charge of quar-

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The Over-Rated BAYONET

By Capt Lewis Meyers

Illustrated by TSgt John DeGrasse

PENDING the perfecting of an atomic hand grenade, the foot troops are here to stay. It seems certain that in any future conflict the infantry will still be in there walking toward the enemy and dragging their recoilless weapons behind them. And dangling at their sides, as it has for 300 years, will be that most useless of weapons—the bayonet.

The bayonet charge always has represented all that was most dashing and glamorous about the infantry, a service notably short on such qualities. The marines, especially, usually have been depicted by artists as lunging along in the wake of their shiny steel blades. Yet in the recent Pacific war the bayonet was rarely employed for anything but opening beer cans, chopping underbrush, and cracking coconuts. It did have one important combat use: to hold the rifle perpendicular to the deck for the support of a flask of plasma, leaving the corpsman's hands free for other duties. And in the post-operation phase two bayonets could be used to break seabag locks when inventorying personal effects of casualties.

It is true that people have been killed by bayonet thrusts. But not very many, when it is remembered that all the infantry in every modern war has been armed with this weapon. On occasion combat casualties have been inflicted with intrenching tools, knives, brass knuckles, sharpened sticks, and rocks. These weapons require none of the protracted hours of practice that most nations devote to the bayonet in wartime.

Most marines in the recent war first met this traditional tool of combat in boot camp; from there on it seldom left them. You started by standing in a circle with the rest of the recruit platoon. Your sheathed bayonet was on the end of your '03 rifle and your arms seemed to be coming off at the shoulders. In the center of the ring the DI demonstrated and bellowed "on guard," "thrust," and "whirl" until he threw



his campaign hat on the deck in foaming fury and despair at your confused contortions. Later, if you were lucky, you watched the inimitable Col Biddle and the mighty Sgt Crystal demonstrate the flat-blade technique in bayonet fencing. Eventually you galloped down the qualification course at high port, grunting and thrusting at burlap sacks and trying to make your feet come out right. And finally, if you hadn't broken both wrists, impaled yourself on a boom, or missed a dummy completely, you were the proud wearer of a little bar on your basic medal, proclaiming you an "Ex. Bayonet."

Certainly there was nothing wrong with PI methods of making marines. And Col Biddle and Sgt Crystal were gold mines of morale and fighting spirit. But a lot of time and effort was expended on an unworthy subject—the bayonet.

No training was complete without it. If you went to Candidates Class the parries and thrusts began all over again while the football men in the class threw their trick knees all over the qualification course. In Reserve Officers Course the flat-blade technique turned up again in combat conditioning. And from then on you went through the same bayonet routine with troops—repeating it periodically and every time you got replacements.

All of this for the most over-rated weapon in the world. In the recent war just about everybody who came near any front line anywhere carried a bayonet religiously. But I know of only one authentic occasion when the bayonet performed its primary mission of inflicting casualties on the enemy: in a Namur shellhole

For 300 years soldiers have deluded themselves with the myth of "cold steel"

a Marine officer ended a Jap's sabre swinging with a bayonet thrust (short). Of course there were other such casualties on both sides—but not nearly enough to justify the millions of bayonets fixed in foxholes all over the world.

Why, then, do all hands revere this antique weapon? It is supposed to shatter enemy morale when you advance with the naked steel but there is little evidence that it ever did. It did boost your own spirits to know you had a close-in weapon ready, in case only a click resulted when you squeezed the trigger at an interesting moment. Yet every marine wore a combat knife—a real close-in weapon—and a high percentage of the front-line troops cherished pistols and revolvers. The pistol-knife combination was ideal for a night in a foxhole when the grenades didn't stop that scurrying in the bushes. A bayonet on a rifle was not much help against infiltration in the dark or against a banzai rush. Off the rifle it became a clumsy knife.

It was this same desire to have an auxiliary weapon that gave the bayonet its start in 1647. At Ypres in that year the Seigneur de Puysegur had his troops thrust their daggers into the muzzles of their muskets after firing. Some sources credit Basque smugglers with improvising this last-ditch weapon a few years earlier. In any case, its use combined in one man the functions of the medieval fire team which up till that time had consisted of a pikeman and a musketeer, with the former standing by for the close-range work. De Puysegur and his troops came from Bayonne and their short, round-handled daggers were known as Bayonettes. There hasn't been much change in the name, mission, or technique of the Seigneur's creation in three centuries.

The new weapon lost some of its appeal when it fouled things up for some English troops at Killiecrankie in 1689. They wedged their daggers in the muzzles for a charge, then later they couldn't fire when they had the targets. This sad sample of a bayonet charge established a tradition of uselessness which has had few exceptions in three hundred years of combat. The luckless troops having demonstrated a serious defect in a front line weapon, it was natural that their defeated general should devise a correction. His solution was similar to that which had appeared in France by 1678—the bayonet was modified and attached by two loose-fitting rings which made it possible to fire the piece with the blade fixed and not have the barrel curl back in your face. In the 1690's Vauban's socket model appeared, with the lower part

shaped like an elbow, giving the bayonet a firmer seat on the barrel and still permitting the piece to be fired. In the Peace of Ryswick (1697) the English and the Germans abolished the pike and adopted the socket, zig-zag model as an instrument of international policy. All types of socket bayonets still had an important weakness, however—the enemy could pull the blade from the firearm with a sudden tug. A spring clip in the socket was the answer here and it turned up in various places, Sir John Moore introducing it in England in 1805. Another major modification had appeared near the end of the 1700's in the sword bayonet, a weapon in itself. Most bayonets have been of this type ever since.

Thus by the beginning of the 18th century there was just one type of infantryman. He carried a firearm and he had a bayonet to give him some protection while reloading (a protracted process at this period, involving powder, ball, and an ignition device). The socket bayonet also helped the foot slogger of the early 1700's keep his spirits up when the rain and the wind had soaked his powder or had blown it out of the pan—two events that did not raise the musketeer's morale. And finally he was able to look cavalry in the face as long as he could greet the sabreslashers with a wall of steel (cold). There is no doubt, then, that the Seigneur de Puysegur's dagger changed the tactical picture in his own day. But its day was a long time ago.

NOT that it has lacked attention. The bayonet has been described as "the tactical obsession of the 19th century." But there is little record of anybody ever fighting with the damn thing. Everyone figured everyone else was going to. So all hands practiced with it and developed national models of the bayonet and paraded with it (fixed).

The United States had an early socket model with a 16 1/4-inch blade, tapering from one inch wide down to a sharp point and grooved on both sides. This weapon was designed for use with the Springfield musket, Model 1822. Twenty years later, with the '42 rifle, a triangular bayonet was issued, having deep grooves on all three sides of its 17 1/2-inch blade. It also had a spring clamp to lock the socket. The Federal forces in the Civil War used a bayonet similar to the 1842 model but with a longer socket and a narrower blade.

The Springfield 1888 rifle was issued with a ramrod bayonet, an innovation so unsatisfactory that President Roosevelt (the First) finally wrote a letter in 1905 to the Secretary of War, declaring "I must say that I think this ramrod bayonet about as poor an invention as I ever saw." He requested that opinions on bayonet

models be compiled from witnesses of the fighting in the Russo-Japanese War and from officers who had seen action in the Philippines. From this investigation came the Model 1905 bayonet, a knife type with a 16-inch blade sharpened on the front edge and on the first 5 inches of the back.

Before World War I, then, all nations had their bayonets ready. But going back through history, how much reason did they have to bother with this weapon? The records indicate that it never was thrust into hostile bodies as frequently as bayonet ballyhoo claimed. The 19th century, reputedly obsessed with the cold steel in the tactical sense, was dominated at the start by Napoleon. One of his brilliant veterans, Gen Jomini, lived until 1869 and he is on record as saying he "never witnessed a bayonet charge."

The American Civil War evokes pictures of surging battlefields with the colors waving above the charging blades. Yet Maj Hart, a Union surgeon with extensive combat experience, declared he could count only a "half dozen bayonet wounds dressed." Capt John W. DeForest, one of the more literate and observant participants in the War Between the States, wrote of one of his early combat experiences: "I had sabre and revolver all ready, for, of course, I expected a severe hand-to-hand struggle; not having yet learned that bayonet fighting occurs mainly in newspapers and other works of fiction."

The trenches of World War I changed the emphasis back to the bayonet. The renewed tactical importance of the cold steel was expressed in 1916 by Capt R. B. Campbell, of the Gordon Highlanders, in speaking to the Royal Marines. "The big gun is responsible for the bayonet," he said. "The only way to get protection from artillery is by entrenching, and the only way to get a man out of a trench is with the bayonet."

The captain called the attention of his audience to the situation in France where the two armies were "both entrenched within a stone's throw of each other, neither able to move one way or the other."

"The present state of affairs cannot go on forever," Capt Campbell said; "The climax must come, and the climax by logical reasoning will be great hand-to-hand battles decided by the infantry with bayonet and knife, with the artillery and cavalry on both sides standing off awaiting

the issue, ready to pursue or protect."

Two years later marines in France found the captain's predictions close to reality among the rocks and trees of Belleau Wood. And at Soissons his foresight was further vindicated when French cavalry also was on hand to exploit the breakthrough of the Americans and the Moroccans.

Before attributing these victories to the bayonet, however, it is well to remember the machine guns on both sides, the rifle marksmanship of the marines, the presence of tanks, and the fact that the artillery did not stand off awaiting the issue. The citations of the Medals of Honor awarded marines in France make it clear that there were times when the bayonet was used effectively, though by individuals rather than in mass slashings as visualized by Capt Campbell.

The next year (1917) marines at Parris Island were aware of the latest theories in bayonet fighting. A translation of an article by Andre Gaucher on "New Principles of Bayonet Fighting" appeared in the *Marine Corps GAZETTE* for September. M. Gaucher was recognized as the foremost French authority on the weapon and was founder of the Comite du "Combat a la Baionette." His article was translated by a retired Marine officer at PI and the original French illustrations were re-enacted and photographed by Marine personnel.

M. Gaucher believed the French troops had an innate superiority with the *arme blanche* and



... people have been killed by bayonet thrusts . . .



... you galloped down the qualification course at high port, grunting and thrusting at burlap sacks . . .

gave "two most typical examples." The first concerned the sabre work of some light cavalry in cutting up a Russian Guards regiment at Austerlitz. The second described a charge at Waterloo by two battalions of Napoleon's Old Guard. Fourteen of Blucher's battalions had overcome six battalions of the Young Guard at Plancenoit, hitting the Charleroi highway and cutting the French communications. The Old Guard charge regained the lost ground, inflicted 2,000 Prussian casualties, and was stopped only by artillery firing grape. This success was attributed by M. Gaucher to the fact that the Old Guard had practiced bayonet fighting for 20 years and were thus a match for the Prussians at 7 to 1 odds.

Admitting this to be a great victory for the bayonet, as well as for the esprit and discipline of the Old Guard, it is still possible to take exception to the main points of M. Gaucher's "New Principles of Bayonet Fighting." He declared: "What we need today is a method, simple and rational, that will enable our foot soldiers to be trained efficiently and rapidly in the *duel* with the bayonet.

"This word, which at first sight may appear astonishing, is nevertheless very appropriate. In all charges of cavalry or infantry two human masses, hurled one against the other, clash and break up at the same instant into a number of

single combats. All along the front, series of groups, each composed of two men, face each other, and victory hangs on the good or bad issue of tens, hundreds, or even thousands of individual duels, according to the length of the fighting line.

"On the strength of this observation, we can build up a theory, according to the principles of which the charge is made up of two distinct periods:

1. An initial collective movement, or advance in mass.

2. Groups of single fights between two men, truly duels resulting from the first move."

This theory has little relation to reality in any war. Certainly the Old Guard at Waterloo did not pair off with 14 battalions of Prussians who outnumbered them half a dozen times. No more did the few hundred marines duel with the Germans they drove from Bouresches in 1918.

When hand-to-hand fighting does take place, it always has and always will be at haphazard and shifting odds. During the recent war, American bayonet training finally made allowance for this fact and practice included two men against one, and three against two.

In the years after World War I one authority wrote that the lessons of that conflict "indicate that some kind of bayonet may still be necessary in order to frighten one's enemy and to give oneself confidence in close fighting, but the occasions when it will be driven home will probably be rare."

Also Col C. J. Miller, in his Introduction to Col Biddle's *Do or Die*, declared: "Whether or not we believe the bayonet is still worth retaining as a weapon, bayonet fighting or its refinement, bayonet fencing, as illustrated in this manual, remains a part and parcel of the individual's training as heretofore. No other form of training instills greater confidence in the prowess of the soldier or creates the self-determination and overwhelming impulse to close with the enemy than is fostered by bayonet training. Herein lies its great value."

A round-up of national models in the late 1920's reveals that the British, as a result of World War I, had adopted a new model, virtually a spike, 8 inches long and no thicker than a lead pencil. It was designed to permit maxi-

Continued on page 42

Fletcher Pratt's

THE Marines IN THE Pacific War

Illustrated by TSgt John DeGrasse

IV

CLEMENS' first act was to organize some of the natives in a service of information, which is not as silly as it might sound, since a good many of them were members of the Solomons Islands Police Force and knew a military position when they saw one. The earliest result was a report that way down to the east of our position, the Japs had set up a radio station. It would be the equivalent of the Allied coast watching system, capable of notifying them when and where our reinforcements and supplies were coming in. On the same 19th that saw the action at the Matanikau, therefore, Capt Charles H. Brush, Jr., with a company from the 1st Regiment started out to pick up this station. There were native guides and the patrol worked along the trails well inland.

Toward evening this patrol made contact with an enemy patrol on one of the jungle trails. Brush was astounded at finding Japs in fighting shape out there but not surprised. He deployed one platoon and sent the other to get behind the enemy. As the Japs came trotting blissfully along the trail without even security detachments out he let them have it from every gun in the company. The Japs got a machine gun set up which cut down three of the marines and wounded three more but it was knocked out by rifle and grenade. The Japs broke and were all shot but a couple who escaped into the bush. When the bodies were examined it was clear this patrol had been something special. There were 35 men, clean shaven and wearing new uniforms which bore the insignia not of the Naval Landing Force like all those hitherto, but of the Imperial Army. Four of them were officers; and they were carrying a lot of radio gear, far too much for a mere coast watcher station. Brush searched the bodies for documents and found a good many which were immediately sent off to the command while he followed more slowly with his wounded.

The documents confirmed the obvious deduction from the appearance of the men. There

was a special code for rapid ship-to-shore communications during action—also several diaries with entries showing the force had left Truk since the American landing on Guadalcanal. This would be the advance scouting party of the counterattack then, but how strong it was all told was unclear, and was it true that all had landed east of the perimeter as seemed likely? No data. Gen Vandegrift rejected the idea of using the single battalion he had in division reserve for a counterattack in spite of the attractive prospect of surprising their main body as Brush had surprised a part. Instead he pulled the east flank of his line slightly back from the upper reaches of the Tenaru, cut fields of fire for the weapons on this flank, and threw out a screen of native scouts, with listening posts at the Ilu. That night there were Jap ships in the channel doing a good deal of firing. They caught two of the Higgins boats we had on antisubmarine patrol and sank them both. Toward morning there was a little rifle fire out toward the Ilu and some of the marines in the river position complained of being eaten alive by ants. One of the enemy destroyers stayed till daylight. A B-17 arrived from New Caledonia, rather surprisingly hit her on the tail with a bomb, and sent her out of there with a lovely fire burning.

The morning was the morning of 20 August which started like other days but that afternoon came the first good news. There was a roar of aircraft engines and it was not Jap bombers, but our own planes, Marine planes—a squadron of 19 F4F fighters, Squadron 223, and a dozen Douglas dive-bombers, Squadron 232, catapulted in from the escort carrier *Long Island*, far at sea. Now there would be something to say in answer to the daily attacks. "Morale has gone up twenty points this afternoon," one of the officers told Tregaskis, the correspondent.

About midnight that night flares went up from the listening posts out eastward and presently their crews came tumbling in with word there was Jap activity all around them. Isolated scouts always tend to be nervous and not too

much weight was given to the report, but the 2d Bn, 1st Marines was given a stand-to in its Tenaru position and the 1st Bn alerted to move in in support.

The action was correct; Ichiki had arrived and the rustlings our men heard were his numerous scouting parties, which only by luck and the grace of the jungle night had missed picking up the listening forces. At the time the flares went up the Jap commander had already had a fairly good sketch of our position at the mouth of the stream and had determined how he would take it. Within another hour he had his 70 mm battalion guns, machine guns, and the grenade throwers our people called "knee mortars," set up to smother with fire our position at the mouth of the river while his infantry should rush across the sandbar, here a hundred yards wide. At 0310 he gave the signal; all his pieces opened up with a crash that drowned the *Banzai* as his men rushed, 200 in the first wave.

The shock was terrific; in that first blaze of fire the marines lost more men than they had so far on the island, the first rush of the Japs came right across the bar and into our outer positions, knocking out some of the guns and setting up some of their own. But quite a lot of the zing was taken out of the push by the single strand of barbed wire (which the Japs thought electrified) and still more by our machine guns, a couple of which really fired to the last man. This made the attack a group in-

filtration rather than a punch. A bright lieutenant named McClanahan managed to reorganize behind the broken front positions and with the help of some very accurate mortar fire, drove the Japs back to their sandbar and reestablished the line. The affair settled down to a fire fight of the most intense character in which our side would not have the worst of it, since the Marine artillery chimed in from the rear, combing over the whole grove in which the Japs must be lying.

By daybreak it was apparent to LtCol Edwin A. Pollock of the 2d Bn that the enemy force was not big enough to break his position. There was no action on his upstream flank, they were all concentrated down at the sandbar. It was therefore time to consider counterattack; Col Cates' 1st Bn (Cresswell) was moved upstream to get across on to the enemy rear while the General dispatched five tanks to help out. The 1st Bn executed its sweep without opposition till near the shore, where at the Block Four River they found the Jap rear guard in some native houses, a single platoon. Cresswell put a whole company on to this platoon; the platoon came out in a *Banzai* charge and were all shot down.

It was now about 1000 and the rest of the battalion had reached the sea on one flank, the river on the other, and were closing in on the triangle of land that held the Japs. Progress was slow but steady, the marines covering each other with fire as they made small rushes among the

Shouting *Banzai*, Ichiki's men rushed, 200 men in the first wave . . . the shock was terrific.



coconuts, while each individual Jap seemed determined to fight his own battle, and their occasional efforts to break from the closing net were disorganized.

As a matter of fact, Ichiki was not trying to break from the net except forward, still convinced that spiritual power was going to win the battle for him. He had filtered some of his men out along the reverse slope of the sandbar, where they inched slowly forward. About the time Cresswell's move really began to pinch his rear, he ordered a whole platoon to take the American position from the flank by swimming. American fighter planes unexpectedly appeared and broke up the sandbar attack by strafing; the platoon in the water was picked off by the rifle fire of marines who very much enjoyed their target practice on the bobbing heads.

At about 1500 Ichiki's situation became worse yet; for Cresswell's men now had him thoroughly pinned in the contracting triangle and across the sandbar appeared the ominous shapes of American tanks. The Ichiki detachment was made up of picked men; they rushed the tanks and succeeded in disabling two with hand weapons, but the rest came right on, shooting in all directions, and now cruised back and forth through the grove, crushing the unfortunate remains of the Jap force into the ground where it lay pinned by increasing fire. The Colonel regretfully burned his colors and shot himself through the head. In his diary was found a neat schedule—"17 Aug. The landing. 20 Aug. The march by night and the battle. 21 Aug. Enjoyment of the fruits of victory."

By 1700 there was nothing left of the force but 900 dead, 15 prisoners, and some dozen men later reported as robbing native gardens among the hills to the south. The Marines had lost 34 killed and 75 wounded.

LtGen Hyakutate reported to Tokyo, "The attack of the Ichiki Detachment was not entirely successful."

V

THE British carrier raid on Timor never did come off for reasons best known to HM Admiralty, but our raid on Makin did, though not till August 27, while the troops on Guadal were moving into position for the fighting along the Matanikau. LtCol Evans R. Carlson was the commander, a skinny man with one of those faces that looked like creased leather. His formation was the 2d Raider Bn, "Carlson's Raiders" henceforth and forever. Maj James Roosevelt, the President's son, was his exec.

The trip down from Pearl was made aboard two old but gigantic submarines, *Argonaut* and *Nautilus*, on the theory that surprise could be had by coming up from underneath against the

approximately 250 Japs supposedly occupying this minor base.

Perhaps Maj Eliot's too-accurate guess made the enemy think of Makin after the prediction about Tulagi had worked out so very closely. At all events the commandant on the island, which is a long finger of coral sand guarding the southeast flank of the lagoon, had a good prepared position ready to defend the vital areas of his radio station and supply dumps. There were snipers who had been slung in the trees for as much as three days and when the subs hove to off shore at dawn on 17 August all hands in the garrison were on the alert and even had their puttees carefully wrapped.

The strange part is that all this preparation failed to do the Japs any good; nor did they benefit from the fact that many of the motors on the rubber boats that carried our men ashore would not work, while the tidal swell proved so troublesome that all the boats had to make a confused rush at a single beach instead of two neat groups going in, each to a separate location.

Not a shot was fired as the Raiders went ashore and they were already forming under cover of the thick foliage in the first grey light when a rifle went off accidentally and gave the secret of their arrival away. Carlson at once rushed his Co A across the island to get on the main road down the lagoon side, while Co B got into the prepared Japanese position from the rear without a fight, so he evidently had his surprise after all.

Co A touched its flank to the lagoon and turned south; but after a half mile of advance with light now fully breaking, bullets began to whistle, and then Japs were seen tumbling off bicycles along the road ahead, with more of them in trucks behind. There was a powerful .55 caliber antitank rifle in the Raider equipment. It opened up on the trucks; they stopped and now there was a hot moving fire fight that lasted nearly all day, with the Jap snipers in trees extremely troublesome. The enemy were in pockets, usually centering around a machine gun. When the Raiders surrounded one the Japs would scream and shriek for a while to get their spiritual power worked up, and then all jump to their feet and run at the marines who shot them down and finished the job with knives.


Meanwhile there were difficulties with the radios, which worked only well enough to notify the two submarines that the Japs had a couple of ships in the lagoon, but not well enough to enable the marines ashore to spot the gunfire for our ships. *Nautilus* and *Argonaut* fired anyway, raking the whole lagoon, and they sank both ships; the natives said one of them had 60 soldiers aboard and they all drowned. Meanwhile Jap planes had appeared a couple of times

and in the afternoon they staged a regular performance, a formation of bombers coming over accompanied by one of the big Kawanishi flying boats. The bombers bombed and one of them landed in the lagoon along with the Kawanishi. As to the first, Col Carlson had just pulled in his flanks a little in the hope of drawing the Japs forward; the enemy bombers obligingly laid their eggs among their own people. As to the second, the antitank rifles were turned on the planes that landed; the Kawanishi burned up at once, the bomber got a couple of feet off the water and then crashed.

Now the Jap fire began to peter out and it grew dark. The Raiders were supposed to embark again and go on to Makin Meang or Little Makin, some distance to the north. But when they tried to put the boats in the water serious

a single marine and also laid some eggs on Makin Meang, results unknown. The food and weapon patrols had things unexpectedly easy, finding no Japs. They blew up the radio station, burned the storage tank with a lot of aviation gas, gathered some canned meat and crackers and raided the house of the Jap commandant for his papers. Some of the natives said that practically all the Jap soldiers on the island had been killed; those who remained were termite laborers in hidey-holes somewhere and it was not worth digging them out even for the sake of getting prisoners, which had originally been one of the objects of the expedition.

That night Col Carlson got the remaining boats across to the lagoon side of the island and launched them in a group, all lashed to an outrigger canoe. He and his men were picked



trouble with the surf developed. The motors got wet, went out and stayed out. The rollers came in so sharp and quick that paddling got the marines nothing but the loss of their equipment and attempts to swim out cost the lives of five men. They kept trying and just after daybreak four of the boats did reach *Argonaut*, but there were still 120 marines on the beach, now badly exhausted, many of them shivering since they had stripped for the paddling and swimming off shore, and with four stretcher cases among them. During the night a Jap patrol of eight men had shown up, three of them being killed by Pvt Hawkins before he himself was twice shot through the chest. There was evidently still resistance on the island and the coming of day brought Jap planes so the subs had to go down.

It looked like disaster, but as Col Carlson remarked, "No matter how bad your situation is, there is a possibility that the enemy's may be worse." Making the best of a bad business, he sent one group toward the north end of the island in search of native outrigger canoes that would ride the surf and several patrols of others southward to search the more inhabited parts for weapons and food. The latter were interrupted by a flight of Jap planes which seemed to be in a fine state of confusion; they bombed the whole length of the island without hitting

up at the lagoon entrance. They arrived in Pearl Harbor singing and piratical of appearance. Hawkins grew a magnificent red beard and allegedly cured himself of his chest wounds by getting up from the hospital bed and taking a walk.

VI

THE Makin raid, the Battle of the Tenaru, and the arrival of our planes marked a period not only in the struggle for Guadalcanal, but in the whole story of amphibious operations in the Pacific. Difficulties and deficiencies had appeared, notably at Makin, where the failure of the Evinrude gasoline motors nearly brought the expedition to disaster and the marines did not know till they were forced to learn it that they had won a complete victory ashore.

In fact, looking back at those first few weeks of Guadalcanal the really striking feature is how little anyone on the Japanese side realized that they were dealing with something bigger and tougher and a great deal smarter than they had yet encountered. The Marine doctrine really had functioned at Guadalcanal and Makin; the enemy had really been defeated at every contact. There were several reasons for this double failure of correct appreciation. The facts were overlaid by exterior circumstances.

Gen Vandegrift was an extremely tough minded individual, but on short rations and isolated as he was, without even proper elementary tools, with a sea full of Japs around him and sniping on the perimeter all night, under constant air attack, with continual reports of additional enemy landings, and the only apparent promise of assistance resting on the small driplets that could be brought in by the APDs, it would be wonderful if he had considered his position good or his operation successful.

On the other side the Japanese had the universal record of their own success down through the Indies, Malaya, and the Philippines behind them. They had won a great victory at Savo Island—and all this confirmed what they had been learning not only from experience but also the indoctrination since childhood, ever since

the early days of the Russian War. White men did not know how to fight. They relied too much on their mechanical instruments, on fire power; they were easily discouraged. It was true that the original garrison of the islands round Guadalcanal had disappeared and the Ichiki detachment had now followed them into oblivion. But one must remember that there were no reports from these illustrious departed souls to indicate why they had departed. To any normal command mind such a pair of isolated events must appear as exceptional, as up to this time they were. To a Japanese it would seem that there must have been some personal failure on the part of the Japanese commanders involved. The system was not wrong; it had produced spectacular results before and it would be so again.



Chapter 4

FLASH FROM RADIO TOKYO—AIRFIELD TAKEN

THE younger officers of the Imperial Navy had for a long time wished to increase the emphasis on carrier operations. Although most of the top brass was intensely conservative, Adm Yamamoto leaned to their view and the success of the carriers at Pearl Harbor provided the necessary impetus. A new organizational setup was designed about that time under which the 3d Fleet, previously consisting of cruisers only, should be erected into a combination of scouting, screening, and supporting ships—cruisers and carriers, with the flag in one of the latter. The loss of the 1st Fleet carriers at Midway made some such reorganization immediately imperative. Not much over one-tenth of the pilots who had participated in that unfortunate incident were in a physical state for service, but these were sent down to Kyushu to be the nucleus of the new 3rd Fleet Air Wing. They were joined by young pilots just out of the training schools, with whom they would work.

Adm Takata, G-3 to the great Yamamoto, considered that the losses at Midway were primarily due to over-concentration on attack tactics at the expense of training in search. After

the 3rd Fleet pilot organization was set up on 15 July he proscribed two months of the most rigorous training, particularly in search. Unfortunately the American invasion of Guadalcanal upset this schedule. The Imperial General Staff considered it necessary to send most of the 3rd Fleet pilots to Rabaul at once and although the Navy complained bitterly that the military were too concerned with their own fears and lacked the true *Bushido*, the shift was made. It was mainly in the form of reinforcing the 25th Air Flotilla, the Navy unit already operating from the New Britain base.

In the meanwhile the new carrier *Hayataka* had come into service; *Shokaku* and *Zuikaku* had completed repairs of the damage received at Coral Sea. The 1st Fleet could therefore mobilize four carriers (the other being the *Ryujyo*) to escort Gen Hyakutake's troops to Guadalcanal. That officer was very insistent on the need for carrier cover, since it appeared that the Americans had installed planes on the island and the 25th Air Flotilla had difficulty in dealing with American planes operating so close to their own fields.

The General had not really expected Col Ichiki to do much more than administer to the Americans one of those "stout and crushing blows on the head" which would cause them to lose their initiative. Even as the valiant Colonel was burning his colors at the mouth of the Tenaru, Hyakutate was approving the orders prepared by MajGen Kiyotake Kawaguchi, whose brigade would be sent in during August-September. These orders were carefully drawn to take advantage of the specifically American defects as stated in the Imperial Staff Manual—"The American soldiers are extremely weak when they lack the support of fire power. They easily raise their hands during battle and when wounded they give cries of pain. Their flanks and rear are extremely susceptible. Their training in reconnaissance and security is exceedingly inadequate."

In sum, the plan provided for a surprise attack on the flanks and rear of the American position from all directions at once, so that the enemy's fire power would be bewildered by the variety of impressions and unable to recover itself in the time necessary. The cover at Guadalcanal was good and given the American deficiencies in matters of scouting, there would be no particular difficulty in reaching the necessary positions without detection.

Gen Hyakutate ordered the Kawaguchi Brigade up to Truk, where the 1st Fleet had already assembled and whence the second echelon of the Ichiki detachment had sailed several days before. The latter, known as the Kuma group since Col Ichiki's unfortunate demise, was worked into Gen Kawaguchi's plans, giving him a total of some 4,500 men and a certain amount of fire power. It would seem that at least one of the Japs who escaped the massacre on the Tenaru somehow got to a radio. At all events, the fresh group adopted "Remember the Ichiki suicide" as its watchword, and Kawaguchi's order stated that the purpose of the expedition was to "annihilate the enemy on the left bank sector of the Tenaru and thus give rest to the departed souls of the commander of the Ichiki detachment and his men."

From the rest of the order emerges the detail that the brigade was to operate pretty much as a series of independent infantry battalions, four of them. Col Oka of the 124th Regiment, the biggest single unit of the brigade, would be landed with a reinforced battalion combat team from this regiment at the mouth of the Matanikau and would attack across that river. The remainder of the brigade would for secrecy's sake land even further down the coast to the east than Ichiki had and work through the jungles across the ridges that step up to the central spine of the island. Said the order—"Passage through the jungles will be executed chiefly in the daytime; but be sure to make complete

detour around grass fields by day. If passage through a grass field is unavoidable at night, try not to leave any footprints."

One battalion of the 124th would hit the inland, open flank of the American position along the Tenaru. The main "central" force was to strike across a dominating ridge south and a little east of the airfield directly upon it; this force consisted of the remaining battalion of the 124th with an attached battalion (the Aoba) and the infantry battalion of the Kuma group, whose guns would be added to the brigade artillery to provide preparation fires both on the front of this main attack and for the movement to flank the Tenaru position. Naval forces would enter the channel and conduct heavy diversionary attacks on Lunga Point to convince the enemy that a counter landing was taking place.

Gen Kawaguchi's order was far from clear and it made no provision whatever for either support or reserves, but the latter was not a defect from his point of view or from Gen Hyakutate's. It was a means of moving every Japanese warrior, filled with incomparable devotion to his Emperor, into personal contact with the enemy at the earliest possible moment. In war it is not the overall number of men in an area that counts; it is the number actually in contact. Once contact was established the unquestionable superiority of the Japanese in hand-to-hand fighting would be decisive.

II

THE 1st Fleet swept down from Truk with its transports well in the rear and a line of cruisers and destroyers in visual contact with each other fanned out ahead, while planes from the carriers flew searches still farther out to prevent such another surprise as that of Midway. Beyond them again ranged a few of the big Kawanishi flying boats that were Japan's most useful scouts. The intention was to sweep everything American from the eastern face of the Solomons while the transports entered the island chain past Santa Isabel. Just before noon of the 24th *Ryujo*, the carrier nearest in, flew off a heavy strike to put the American field at Guadalcanal out of business, while the 25th Air Flotilla sent down more planes to cooperate. *Ryujo* had hardly got her strike away when one of the Kawanishis reported a whole gigantic American squadron with two carriers out east of the Solomons and then stopped reporting, evidently shot down. The admiral was annoyed —how had the Americans anticipated us?—But he accepted battle and flew off his strike groups

Actually the anticipation on the American side was partly the persistent cracking of Jap code that had been going on since the beginning of the war and partly an odd piece of luck. To

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Let's Use Our Dress Uniforms

By LtCol Robert D. Heinl, Jr.

Possessing the nation's most colorful collection of uniforms, the Marine Corps should dress to the maximum for both official and social occasions

ACCORDING to Uniform Regulations, 1937, with changes to date, the Marine Corps is still confronted by the problem of its dress uniforms. To many military men of other services, the Marine Corps dilemma in this respect might appear somewhat out of the ordinary. No one questions that the uniforms themselves are handsome, distinctive, traditional, and surely sufficiently varied for all occasions. There is no evidence of wholesale dissatisfaction or ferment of change among marines; no controversy rages among proponents of different types of headgear or advocates of changing all the basic colors. The only problem that has to date eluded solution can be summed up in one question about dress uniforms:

"When can we get a chance to wear them?"

The crux of the dress uniform problem appears simply to be that the Marine Corps has designed, and what is more, retained with wise conservatism, a group of unusually handsome and effective uniforms—and has then omitted every opportunity for officers and enlisted men to wear them.

Naturally, the fact that nobody ever wears his evening dress; or that blues, once a duty uniform, have now been pushed into the full-dress bracket; or that field jackets replace green blouses; or that anyone would rather swelter in gabardine khaki than wear whites—naturally, none of these situations arose as a result of policy or conspiracy to push dress uniforms into disuse. On the contrary, much of this trend developed in the absence of a policy—in the absence, that is, of explicit, affirmative official statement of a policy and tradition of the Marine



Corps that at all times, officers and men should be uniformed to meet maximum rather than minimum standards of dress. Anyone knows that if blues or greens are optional, greens will win out. If field jackets compete with blouses, the field jacket triumphs. If utility clothing and khaki is the choice, the dungarees have it. Choices like these habitually turn marines toward minimum standards of dress for any given occasion. We should reverse the flow and uniform ourselves to the maximum. This can only be done by positive action to limit the wearing of undress uniforms, not only at individual posts and stations, but throughout the Marine Corps as a whole.

As a practical matter, we have the uniforms. In the eyes of civilians (not to speak of the other services), Marine dress clothing constitutes one of our striking assets—it is no accident that blues are traditional to the recruiter. From our own point of view, the morale and disciplinary value of dressing up can hardly, by peacetime standards of course, be questioned. Regardless of the gripes while a man struggles with the hooks and eyes on his blue collar, the same fellow swells with pride in himself and the Marine Corps once he gets onto the street.

Why not, then, use our dress uniforms?

Take the matter of blues.

It is to be presumed that blues will eventually return to general issue and that the uniform can then be used for more than occasional social forays. Nevertheless, if we get back only to the 1940 usage of this handsome and traditional uniform, we will miss much of its utility. Subject therefore, to climate, for full utilization of blues (and of their even less-seen satellite, white-blue-whites), the following program is suggested:



... Blues should be normal uniform for the "dress-up outfits" ceremonies should be habitually conducted in this uniform ...

(1) Blues should be the normal uniform for ships' detachments and for all marines afloat, unless when embarked with FMF units or transient drafts.

(2) Blues should, in the absence of prohibitive factors, be the normal uniform for posts or units in which appearance and smartness are important factors—for the "dress-up outfits," that is: embassy or legation guards; Marine Barracks, Washington; the Naval Academy; special detachments.

(3) Blues should be the prescribed individual uniform for all Marine officers or enlisted personnel serving with the Navy ashore, such as: staff officers, NROTC or Naval Academy instructors, etc. For recruiters, of course, blues are a *must*.

(4) Unit ceremonies should be habitually conducted in blues except when it is desired to inspect or observe the command in other uniforms. As a minimum, every peacetime organization should mount guard or parade at least once a week in blues; garrison organizations might well stand one or more complete guard tours per week in this uniform.

(5) The habitual winter liberty uniform of the Marine Corps should be blue. As long as officers are required to wear uniforms off duty, they should, with short shrift for the old home-to-work custom,* wear blues.

(6) The use of blues for social functions of less than glacial formality should be fully exploited. After all, the uniform is highly decorative, affords contrast with duty uniforms, and, if correctly tailored, causes no more discomfort than any other blouse. For officers reporting, for official calls, and for any sort of officers' club function, blues should again become customary.

Much that has been proposed for blues applies also to whites, although the white uniform is admittedly a social and dress garb without line-of-duty utility except for aides or some officers afloat. What the whites question requires mainly, however, is comparative restudy *vis-a-vis* the khaki blouse. In Marine Corps social situations (cocktail parties and dinners, that is), the tendency has for some years run against whites in favor of full khaki. To a man from Mars, this apparent preference might seem difficult to rationalize because:

(1) Whites are cooler and involve one less layer of clothing than a blouse and shirt.

(2) Whites, like any standing-collar uniform, can be donned more rapidly.

(3) Whites look far dressier, and, in color, represent the traditional summer shade of clothing, male or female.

The only thing that can be said in favor of the khaki blouse as against whites is that gravy and liquor stains are not conspicuous on a khaki background.

"I spent 250 dollars for my evening dress and boat cloak in 1936, and I have only worn them twice since then!" is a common tale of woe. It seems almost unbelievable that the Marine Corps, which possesses, hands-down, the most-handsome, eye-knocking-outest evening dress in the armed forces of the United States, including ROTC units, should virtually never, by its customs, sanction the wearing of such a uniform.

True it is—and this applies equally to all the other dress uniforms under discussion—there have been relatively few opportunities for marines to shine in evening dress between 1941 and 1945. Remember the proud statistics that 98 per cent of *all* Marine officers served overseas during the war.

Nevertheless, greybeard officers who can recall

* "The old home-to-work custom" is the practice, prevalent in many commands, of sanctioning the wearing of extreme undress uniforms which conform to unit working uniforms, by personnel enroute from home to work and vice versa. When not strictly construed and controlled, this privilege usually results in the streets being flooded with officers and enlisted men haphazardly attired in non-liberty uniforms, and fully prepared at any hour to claim benefit of home-to-work travel.

the pre-1940 peacetime Corps can also recall struggling into, not to speak of buying and paying for, civilian evening clothes, white or black tie, while the evening dress and boat cloak shimmered in the shadows of a deep closet or a clothing bag. It is a thesis of this article that any occasion, civil or military, fancy enough to warrant white tie and tails can stand Marine evening dress. On the same basis, let us reconsider our customs in favor of the white mess jacket. Surely our two fine evening uniforms deserve wearing.

Earlier we took note that undress uniforms and minimum standards tend to crowd out dress uniforms and maximum standards. It would be instructive to see why this is so. Stated succinctly, the reasons appear to be as follows:

(1) The inherent American tendency toward informality. Sometimes, in the form of inverted snobbery, this acts positively to dissuade individuals from looking or wearing their best.

(2) The fact that virtually all Marine dress uniforms embody some form of standing collar. Setting aside its handsome appearance and traditional military look (factors not neglected by the smart British, the soldiering Germans, or the warlike Russians), the standing collar is criticized, usually by the adipose or the inexperienced as being uncomfortable. Ask anyone who has missed seaduty, and he will shrink at the thought of a standing collar. His more fortunate colleague who learned to wear a correctly tailored standing collar views it with equanimity. The novice forgets that a blue standing collar keeps you warm in winter (and lets you pile on the sweaters underneath), while a white standing

collar allows you to omit that khaki shirt in summer.

(3) Sheer human laziness prompts many officers and men to prefer inconspicuous uniforms because they can in a service uniform bypass without observation certain niceties of dress and person, whereas no one is more sure of unfavorable notice than the company crumb in a suit of unkempt blues. It is true that dress uniforms require upkeep, but no more, at least by the book, than any other kind of uniform—the lack of preventive maintenance is just more evident.

In summation, let us conclude with a proposed five point Marine Corps policy to govern wearing of the various dress uniforms:

First, *dress up to the maximum*. That is, use dress uniforms for every appropriate occasion, for every purpose that they can stand.

Second, avoid, wherever possible, the prescription of alternate uniforms which tend to undermine proper wearing of dress clothing.

Third, make habitual use of dress uniforms (blue or white-blue-white) for ceremonials, down to and including formal guard mounts.

Fourth, prescribe the dress uniform for liberty. Make it a true "walking-out uniform," as the British so wisely say.

Fifth, for all formal occasions sanction and encourage the wearing of evening dress uniforms in lieu of civilian evening dress.

The benefits to be derived from all this would soon be realized in the tone of discipline and soldierly appearance of marines, as well as by restoration of the high reputation in these matters which "the Old Marine Corps" so justly enjoyed.

US MC

OFFICERS and enlisted men of the U. S. Navy and Marine Corps are to be intensively trained in the fields of advanced science to enable them to man the Navy's new guided missile warships and radically designed aircraft.

Proposals have been set forth to acquaint all personnel with practical information in regards to latest developments in the fields of nuclear physics, electronics, jet propulsion, and guided missiles of all types.

In order that they might be prepared in case an atomic, or "pushbutton," war should develop, the Navy is augmenting its revised training program with additional scientific research.

Research contracts have been drafted for 167 projects to be undertaken at 58 universities and research laboratories while an additional 1,000 scientists and engineers, mostly civilians, will work at the Navy's new 15 million dollar ordnance laboratory in Maryland.

In Brief...

Of the more than 25,000 American troops still on duty in China, more than 80 per cent are marines. Remaining there to keep supply lines open, the marines are preparing for another winter in the Peiping-Tientsin-Tsingtao area with little signs of immediate removal. At present this area is one of the hot spots of the Chinese civil war.

The latest in heavy-carrying airships is the "Stratofreighter," a new double-deck, four-engine, all-cargo airplane. Designed to operate at the low cost of 3.9 cents per ton mile, the new plane will carry 41,000 pounds at better than 300 miles per hour. The ship is divided into four sections to ease loading and unloading.

The Veterans Administration is now handling 90 million dollars monthly in payments of pensions and compensations to more than two million war veterans. Three-fourths of the ex-GIs served in World War II while the remainder saw previous service, some as far back as the old Indian War Campaigns.

The Superfortress, the B-29, remained in the development stage for eight years before it was ready to go into combat. Only after many tests and changes was it accepted as a fighting ship. There were 11 major designs made before it was even committed to metal. The Superfort was the logical improvement of the famed Boeing B-17.

Preparation of historical monographs of campaigns of the U. S. Marine Corps is now being undertaken by the Historical Division, Headquarters Marine Corps. In addition preliminary histories have been prepared of the six Marine Divisions and four Marine Air Wings. The monographs will cover Guadalcanal to Okinawa.

There was a big jump in both total and average of American servicemen who were blinded during World War II in comparison to those blinded in World War I. Only 130 men out of more than four million lost their sight during the first war while more than 1,500 men were sightless through injuries received in the past war.

In the first year after V-J Day, over three million men were discharged from the U. S. Navy. From peak strength of 3,400,000, the Navy is rapidly dropping to its postwar quota of 500,000 men. All reserves, except essential hospital corpsmen and those volunteering to remain on active duty, have been released.

New equipment has been developed by which combat wire in coil form may be laid by certain types of vehicles including the amphibious DUKW. The dispenser that is used is about a foot in diameter, half a foot long, and weighs about 25 pounds. It contains about 3,300 feet of assault wire and can be carried by hand.

Aliens now entering the armed forces do not come under the provisions of Public Law 270 which shortened naturalization routine for men with military service. The law provides that such persons must have served in the military or naval forces prior to 28 December 1945 and must petition for citizenship prior to 31 December 1946.

The Marine Corps Institute is issuing handbooks to all marines covering the courses being presented by the school. A complete description of the courses offered including texts used, number of lessons, and credits given will enable the prospective student to pick the courses that best suit his needs or interests.

American aviation plans to have bombers carry fighter planes in case of future warfare. This revolutionary development would give the fighters a range of nearly 5,000 miles, the range of the B-36 which will carry them. Thus the bombers will carry their own fighter protection at all times.

The 2d Marine Division has made another beachhead landing. However this time the actions and the results were not so drastic. At the Marine Corps League convention held in Atlantic City in October 150 men of the famed division put on a demonstration amphibious landing known as "Operation Boardwalk."

The Navy is planning to have a reserve fleet laid up of 2,204 ships. Protecting the outside of the vessels with a poisonous hot plastic paint and covering topside equipment with a moisture-proof web the Navy will be able to preserve these ships for many years. When they are needed the ships can be put back into commission in from 10 to 30 days.

The Development of **AMPHIBIOUS TACTICS** in the U.S. Navy

By Gen Holland M. Smith (Ret'd)

IT MAY WELL be said that without our knowledge and ever-increasing skill in amphibious tactics, our strategy for defeating the German Armies in Western Europe and bringing about the surrender of Japan in the Pacific would not have succeeded. The inability of the Germans to project their Western Offensive of 1940 across the English Channel in an amphibious assault against the United Kingdom and the failure of the Japanese to exploit their naval and air success at Pearl Harbor in 1941 with landing operations represent, on the other hand, two unique opportunities lost. The foresight of the United States Navy in its development of landing operations doctrine and equipment and amphibious forces was responsible in large measure for our victory. The apparent failure on the part of the Axis Powers to recognize that global strategy must depend on amphibious tactics proved a fatal error.

The Basic Strategy

The battles fought throughout the world from September 1939 until September 1945 were all part of one world war. Never before have so many forces and so much materiel been committed to so many separate yet coordinated combat operations in so many theaters in accordance with one strategic plan and for one common end. Once the United States entered the war, already two years old in 1941, a grand strategy was devised in conjunction with Great Britain, Russia, China, and the other United Nations. In most simple terms this plan called for defeating the European Axis Powers first while maintaining maximum military pressure against Japan in order to achieve the best possible strategic position in the Pacific for forcing a surrender once the European victory had been gained. Although developed for one war, our strategy envisioned two separate tasks in two major areas: — the European-African Middle-Eastern Area and the Asiatic-Pacific Area.

For the United States, and more particularly for our Navy, this involved the following missions with regard to the European War:

1. Maintaining and increasing as rapidly as our expanding productive power permitted our supply of weapons, ammunition, and equipment to our European allies through Lend-lease and other agencies, in order to assist them in applying the greatest force possible against Germany and Italy while preparations for invasion were completed. For the Navy this meant operating the convoy lanes and protecting them against German undersea attack.

2. Assembling, equipping, and training the forces necessary for a full-scale invasion of the European continent and moving those forces to bases in or near the theater of operations, from which the attack was to be launched. The Navy had to complete its program of amphibious readiness and carry out the logistic mission of overseas movement.

3. Conducting the landing operations necessary for the invasions of North Africa, Sicily, Italy, Normandy, and Southern France. This series of operations was conducted in order to destroy German military power in the Mediterranean, secure that ocean for allied communications, force Italy out of the war, and establish and maintain a sufficient military force on the continent to defeat the German armies in the West.

The following tasks were called for in the Pacific war. They were gradually and, to some degree, simultaneously performed as our power increased over a period of three years.

1. Providing a defense with the limited forces available, after the losses incurred in the initial attack against Pearl Harbor and our other island bases, to halt the Japanese advance to the south and east. The Navy stopped the enemy in the battles of the Coral Sea and Midway in May and June of 1942. Then as new vessels were completed and additional forces made available we were gradually able to assume the offensive. From the outset our submarines were

busy destroying Japanese combatant and merchant shipping.

2. Gaining strategic naval and air superiority. 3. Exercising that superiority to exert all-around pressure on the Empire (i.e. from China, Burma, New Guinea, the Netherlands East Indies, the Philippines, the South Pacific, Central Pacific, and North Pacific Areas).

4. Thus extending our control of sea and air. The major and most decisive extensions were westward through the Central Pacific, to the Marianas, Bonins, and Ryukyus, and northwest along the New Guinea-Netherlands, East Indies axis to the Philippine Islands. The gradual destruction of the Japanese Fleet was accomplished as a necessary part of this extension.

5. Gaining bases with which to strike directly at Japan by air and sea. The capture of the Marianas in the summer of 1944, an accomplishment made possible by our previous landings at Tarawa, Makin, Majuro, Kwajalein, and Eniwetok in the Central Pacific and by the sum of the pressures applied against Japanese forces in all other Pacific areas, provided the airfields from which the final blow was delivered. Saipan, Tinian, and Guam were made secure by our subsequent capture and occupation of Iwo Jima. By the summer of 1945, Japan was in a strategically hopeless position. She had suffered disastrous military and naval attrition as a result of losses in all theaters. Our recapture of the Philippine Islands had denied her access to the badly needed resources of the Netherlands East Indies. Our capture of Okinawa and occupation of strong bases in the Marianas presented the ominous threat of an early invasion of the Empire itself. Finally, the timely inception of atomic bombing from our Marianas bases and Russia's declaration of war against Japan forced her to admit what she had realized implicitly for some time, that only two choices remained —surrender or utter destruction.

6. The final, and as it happened unnecessary task, was to be amphibious invasion of Japan from the newly gained bases in the Western Pacific.

The details of the strategy for our participation in the war were developed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, an agency established by President Roosevelt in February 1942. Putting that strategy into tactical execution depended, of course, on the ability of the Nation, and more specifically the industrial home front, to supply the tremendous quantities of war materiel required by the military forces. The problems of distributing that materiel and those military forces to both major war areas was solved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in such a satisfactory manner that while our main effort was being exerted to finish the European war, our strength in the Pacific was simultaneously being in-

creased to a degree where once Germany was defeated, we had achieved a strategic position which caused Japan to sue for surrender in less than four months.

European vs. Pacific Tactics

The amphibious tactics employed to carry out the basic strategic plan for defeating Germany and Japan were fundamentally the same. They were based on the United States Navy's landing operations doctrine. However, the European and Pacific areas presented different problems. The differences between the seizure of invasion beachheads and the capture of advanced island bases has been discussed previously in the introduction to this report. The effect of these differences on the planning and execution of actual operations is reiterated here in order to clarify the influence of each area in the development of amphibious tactics.

General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower was charged with the conduct of our European campaign, a primarily military undertaking. In accordance with the concept of unity of command, commanders of subordinate echelons (e.g. Naval Attack Forces) determined the tactics to be employed in the performance of assigned missions (e.g. landing operations). The amphibious phases of the campaign, although essential, were relatively short in duration, and the Navy's tactical participation was limited. Soon after the initial landing, its mission became largely logistical.

The problem of securing accurate intelligence on which to base tactical plans was solved in much the same manner in both Europe and the Pacific. However, in Europe the objective areas were frequently well charted and accurately mapped. Aerial and submarine reconnaissance and photography were, therefore, chiefly employed to discover new, man-made defensive installations. Political considerations and the existence of friendly underground forces affected military operations in Europe as well as in North Africa and were therefore necessarily included in all estimates of the situation and planning. The shores on which landings were made were consequently not necessarily strictly hostile, nor did those landings always require an assault. Coordinated joint planning was facilitated in Europe because commanders concerned were frequently able to work together under one roof in a joint headquarters.

Landings were made on unlimited continental and masses with extended shore lines, many portions of which were unoccupied, or lightly defended. The enemy usually chose to rely on the use of mobile reserves to strike the landing forces soon after it hit the beach rather than on the occupation of defensive positions at the water's edge. Surprise and night operations

Landing Operations Timetable

Although this report is concerned with the development of amphibious tactics rather than with an historical account of amphibious operations, the following timetable will serve to indicate the chronology of the more significant landing operations of the second world war:

<i>Date:</i>	<i>European Area:</i>	<i>Pacific Area</i>
7 August 1942		Guadalcanal, Tulagi, etc., Southern Solomons Campaign opens in South Pacific Area.
17 August 1942		Makin Island Raid, first Central Pacific landing.
18 August 1942	Dieppe Raid, first Allied landing in force on European Continent since 1940.	
8 November 1942	North African landings to capture Oran, Algiers, and Casablanca.	
11 May 1943		Attu—campaign for recapture of Aleutians opens in North Pacific.
21 June 1943		Segi Point, New Georgia, first landing in Central Solomons, South Pacific Area.
29 June 1943		Nassau Bay, New Guinea, Southwest Pacific offensive opens (10 miles south of Salamaua).
30 June 1943		Main landings at Rendova and Viru, New Georgia, South Pacific Area. Landings simultaneously effected on Woodlark and Trobriand Islands to westward.
5 July 1943		Rice Anchorage, New Georgia, South Pacific.
10 July 1943	Sicily landings at Gela, Scoglitti, and Licata.	Occupation of Kiska in North Pacific.
15 August 1943		Nopoi, New Guinea, Southwest Pacific Area.
3 September 1943	Landings on Italian shore of Straits of Messina.	Finschafen, New Guinea, Southwest Pacific Area.
9 September 1943	Landing at Salerno, Italy.	Mono, Stirling, Treasury Island landings, Northern Solomons, South Pacific Area.
22 September 1943		
27 October 1943		

28 October 1943	Choiseul Island Raid, Northern Solomons, South Pacific Area.
1 November 1943	Empress Augusta Bay, Bougainville, Northern Solomons, South Pacific Area.
20 November 1943	Gilbert Islands invaded at Tarawa and Makin as Central Pacific offensive begins.
15 December 1943	Southwest Pacific Forces invade New Britain Island at Arawe.
26 December 1943	Cape Gloucester, New Britain, Southwest Pacific Area.
1 January 1944	Saidor, New Guinea, Southwest Pacific Area.
22 January 1944	Anzio, Italy.
31 January 1944	Marshall Islands invaded at Majuro by Central Pacific Forces.
1 February 1944	Kwajalein Atoll, Marshall Islands, Central Pacific Area.
14 February 1944	Green Islands, South Pacific Area.
17 February 1944	Eniwetok Atoll, Central Pacific Area.
29 February 1944	Los Negros Island, Admiralty Islands, Southwest Pacific Area.
20 March 1944	Emirau, St. Matthias Islands, Southwest Pacific Area.
22 April 1944	Hollandia, New Guinea, Southwest Pacific Area.
17 May 1944	Wakde Island, New Guinea, Southwest Pacific Area.
27 May 1944	Biak, New Guinea, Southwest Pacific Area.
6 June 1944	Normandy landings, Northern France invasion opens.
14 June 1944	Central Pacific Forces invade Marianas at Saipan.
(19-20 June 1944)	Naval Battle of Philippine Sea.)
2 July 1944	Noemfoor Island, New Guinea, Southwest Pacific Area.

21 July 1944	Guam, Marianas Islands, Central Pacific Area.
24 July 1944	Tinian, Marianas Islands, Central Pacific Area.
30 July 1944	Cape Sansapor, New Guinea, Southwest Pacific Area.
29 August 1944	Invasion of Southern France.
15 September 1944	Peleliu Island, Palau, invaded by Central Pacific Forces. Morotai Island, Southwest Pacific Area.
17 September 1944	Angaur Island, Palau.
23 September 1944	Ulithi Atoll, Central Pacific Area.
20 October 1944	Invasion of Philippines begun with landing of Southwest Pacific Forces at Leyte.
(23-26 October 1944	Naval Battle of Leyte Gulf.)
15 December 1944	Mindoro, Philippine Islands, Southwest Pacific Area.
9 January 1945	Luzon invaded by Southwest Pacific Forces at Lingayen Gulf.
29 January 1945	Further Luzon landings at Subic Bay.
14 February 1945	Mariveles, Luzon.
16 February 1945	Corregidor, Luzon.
19 February 1945	Iwo Jima, Volcano Island, invaded by Central Pacific Forces.
28 February 1945	Palawan, Philippine Islands, Southwest Pacific Areas (followed by extended amphibious operations for recapture of other Philippine Islands).
1 April 1945	Okinawa, Ryukyu Islands, invaded by Central Pacific Forces.
30 April 1945	Tarakan and Sadan Islands, Dutch East Borneo, Southwest Pacific Area. Campaign for reconquest of Borneo begins.
10 June 1945	Brunei Bay, Borneo, Southwest Pacific Area.
1 July 1945	Balikpapan, Borneo, Southwest Pacific Area.

were therefore feasible and desirable. Parachute and airborne troops could well be employed in coordination with the amphibious operations. There was little likelihood of enemy naval intervention, but it was not possible to isolate the target area, and air supremacy at the objective could rarely be counted on. Enemy land-based air attacks were usually launched from the fields outside the immediate landing area and there was, therefore, the requirement for tactical air cover during the landing operations. The enemy could reinforce his defending ground elements in a similar manner. Landing force organization for the amphibious phase was similar in both theatres, but in Europe it was possible for the smaller units to revert soon after the landing to centralized command and to their normal organization for tactical employment in a long campaign. The landing forces in Europe employed more complete and heavier equipment. They required motor transportation and armor for mobility at the earliest opportunity and needed heavy artillery for employment against targets out of range of naval gunfire for the support of the infantry's advance inland. One result was a different type of shipping. Transport organizations had to include a greater number of tank-carrying craft and cargo vessels for transporting heavy equipment. The movement to the objective and the lines of communication were usually shorter in Europe, and shore-to-shore operations were frequently possible. This meant the employment of larger seagoing landing craft. Amphibious vehicles designed to traverse reefs were unnecessary. The training of the landing force did not require emphasis on tactics for assaulting strongly fortified positions. Such installations were not encountered often, and, when they were, there was usually the opportunity to maneuver around them. Fire support for the landing force consisted normally of land-based aircraft employed in mass rather than of naval gunfire or any considerable number of carrier-based planes. This was due to the Army's primary interest in the campaign, to the availability of nearby supporting bases, to the need for distant reconnaissance, observation, and attack missions against targets out of range of naval gunfire, and to the fact that, since there was little threat of enemy naval intervention, there was a small number of combatant ships on hand to provide gunfire support. It should be noted that air support as conducted by the Army involved massed air power against area targets rather than the direct, coordinated, precise pinpoint support characteristic of naval aviation in the Pacific. There was less need for careful coordination of air support with artillery and naval gunfire. The Navy's logistical mission in Europe was different in that heavier equipment such as railroads and construction material was required in the post-assault

phase. However, unloading was frequently facilitated by the presence of developed harbors.

FLEETAdmiral Chester W. Nimitz was charged with the conduct of the campaign against the Japanese in the Pacific Ocean Areas, a primarily naval undertaking. Commanders of Army units participating in the campaign exercised full tactical command over their respective units within the framework of Adm Nimitz's overall unified command. The Navy's participation was a continuous one from the time of the preliminary carrier strike through development of the objective as an advanced base for vessels and aircraft of the Fleet. The pattern of our Pacific offensive customarily included the following:

1. Carrier aircraft strikes, long range surface bombardment, and photographic reconnaissance by Fast Carrier Task Forces.
2. Repeated strikes by these carriers augmented where possible with long range land-based air attacks, which were intensified during the period immediately prior to the target date.
3. Intense, destructive, and deliberate preliminary surface and air bombardment at close range to prepare the objective for landing operations.
4. Dog Day bombardment and the landing of troops covered and continuously supported by fleet guns and carrier aircraft. Covering operations by fleet units on many occasions involved naval actions to prevent intervention by the enemy fleet. The many engagements during the Guadalcanal campaign, the Battle of the Philippine Sea during operations at Saipan, and the Battle of Leyte Gulf incident to our invasion of the Philippines were largely responsible for the destruction of the Japanese fleet.
5. Continuing logistical and tactical support until the island had been captured.
6. Garrison logistics and the development of an air and/or naval base.

THE problems of securing intelligence were more difficult in the Pacific Ocean Areas. Detailed information had to be secured by frequent and repeated air and submarine photographic reconnaissance, for charting and mapping purposes as well as for information on enemy dispositions and defensive organization. There were no political factors involved, and the landing force could count on assaulting a bitterly defended hostile shore. Landing force training, therefore, had to emphasize techniques for storming such positions, develop discipline, and point to the highest coordination in order to realize maximum fire support from all sources available. The joint planning for amphibious operations had to be conducted by the commanders of the component elements of the expeditionary forces,

Continued on page 47

Military Government at Okinawa



All arable land is put to work. Here Okinawans prepare a field for planting sweet potatoes which with rice and fish are the staples of the native diet.

FOR THE Ryukyus, 24 April 1946 marked the beginning of a new era. From the shambles of political, economic, and social chaos wrought upon it by the war, Okinawa was emerging, somewhat more than slightly disheveled, with the first real glimmerings for a hopeful future.

On that day in the office of Col Charles I. Murray, Deputy Commander for Military Government, Ryukyus, a small and somber group witnessed the investiture of Koshin Shikiya as Chief Okinawan civilian official ("Chiji"). With the appointment of the "Chiji," Military Government, Ryukyus, had in the space of 12 short months established an Okinawan governmental system. They now had a civilian administration through which they could talk turkey to the people.

Okinawa, largest Naval military government in the world, hadn't been an easy job for MG.

By Ensign William H. Jacobs

From the very moment MG teams went ashore with the combat troops in April 1945, it had found its task fraught with almost insurmountable obstacles. There was the complete devastation; there was the lack of food, clothing, and shelter for thousands of wandering people; there

was the lack of sufficient transportation; there was the language barrier; and there were a hundred more debilitating factors which made things all but easy.

As U. S. troops went into action in southern Okinawa, MG was called upon to herd natives displaced from their cities and homes into holding camps out of the path of the military.

Despite the fact that the Okinawans were recognized as enemy nationals, and despite the fact that they differed greatly from the Americans in appearance, dress, and custom, they were still human beings and by very virtue of that fact,

Emerging from invasion-borne chaos, the Ryukyus look hopefully to the future



First problem was shelter for the homeless, just temporary huts at first. More permanent housing was constructed later.

if for no other reason, entitled to basic humanitarian needs and treatment.

With that precept in mind MG attacked the problem. Okinawa was battered and beaten. Its whole economic, political, and social structure collapsed or was obliterated by the fury of war. Naha, capital of Okinawa, with a prewar population of 70,000 and Shuri, "seat of the Okinawan kings," with a prewar population of 17,000, to mention only the two largest cities, were reduced to rubble by the savage poundings of American guns and planes. Huge quantities of land, backbone of Okinawa's agricultural economy, were made sterile by the construction of camps for the American troops. With, and even in some cases preceding this destruction, came the wholesale flight to the hills by the homeless Okinawans.

MG had its job cut out. The people must be gathered together; they must be fed; and they must have a roof over their heads. During the months of April, May, and June 1945, the food shortage was alleviated by the use of large abandoned Jap food caches found in caves. This furnished approximately 95 per cent of the food supply, the other 5 per cent coming from American ships. By the middle of June the recovered Jap foodstuffs had run out and American supply sources were forced to furnish 90 per cent of the food necessities for a people already beginning to show signs of malnutrition. Fortunately, many Army, Marine, and Naval units on the island turned over sizable quantities of canned foods, and K and C rations to MG to minimize the food shortage.

Meanwhile, efforts were made to get every inch of undestroyed, arable land under cultivation to furnish the Okinawans with at least a minimum diet of sweet potatoes and rice.

Shelter for the displaced Okinawans was another thorny project for MG. With an estimated 10 per cent of the dwellings intact after the invasion and 300,000 people without permanent shelter, MG had a "touch and go" job on its hands. The first step was the improvising of makeshift, ramshackle cover for the thousands of homeless Okinawans swarming aimlessly over the roads and fields. Speed, not suitability, was the paramount factor. Then came the construction of temporary huts made of thatch, tree branches, mud, rock, tin, and whatever else was

lying around handy to form a slightly more substantial shelter.

But this could not house the homeless adequately. Twenty-five and 30 people were jam-packed into small, squalid hovels. Lying side by side at night, and swarming over each other by day, the Okinawans soon began to show the effects of these living conditions. Disease and illness were breaking out. The tubercular rate was rising.

Something had to be done to provide not only the basic needs of these people, but also to protect the lives and health of American personnel who must, of necessity, work and live with the people involved.

Adequate housing was necessary to rid the island of the disease and pestilence that was then working havoc. A complete island-wide housing program was devised with minimum lumber requirements. For durability and sanitation, however, lumber was a prime necessity. The houses were built with wooden frame and floor, and thatch body and roof. Because standing lumber is a scarcity on Okinawa other supply sources had to be tapped. Scrounging and salvage parties dug up myriad scrap piles of wood. Deactivating military units were gone over with a fine-tooth comb for every speck of construction material. Then MG secured permission to draw from various military lumber supply yards on the island and the housing problem was finally met.

In most instances when the Okinawan people fled their homes they took with them only what they wore, and, if not already destroyed, those possessions they could carry on their backs. As a result, practically the entire population of southern Okinawa, upwards of 200,000 people, were without sufficient clothing. MG filled the

bill with great quantities of salvaged GI apparel, and the Okinawans with typical ingenuity did the rest.

By the latter part of August, MG had served most of the minimum needs of the people in food, clothing and shelter. There was still plenty to do along those lines to reduce malnutrition and furnish a better balanced diet, and to provide better housing and sanitation conditions, but at least there was a moment to pause and consider some of the broader aspects of the planning program.

There was time to think about a well-defined agricultural program; to draw up a plan for the rehabilitation of Okinawan industry, a complete war casualty; to think about reestablishing the educational system, another annihilated element in the Okinawan social order; to do something about rebuilding the Okinawan courts and police system; to think about resurrecting a monetary economy and a civilian administration, totally disrupted by war.

Agricultural production was increased when additional land was obtained for cultivation from the armed forces. More and more foodstuffs were turned over to MG by deactivating units. The October typhoon also netted great supplies of salvaged tinned foods. The food situation was becoming brighter. Food was still rationed, however, and the land was still farmed communal fashion with the harvest going to a central ration point for distribution.

Okinawan industry started on the long road back during these months from October 1945 through February 1946. Mat-weaving, pottery, tile, wood products, salt, iron-works, sugar cane, sake, lacquer ware, and many others were literally built up from the Okinawan dirt into which they had fallen. In many instances American machinery and equipment were necessary to start the production lines moving again. In other cases, enough former Okinawan equipment could be salvaged to do the job.

The fishing industry, the importance of which can be seen by the fact that Okinawans consider fish in much the same light as Americans consider meat, was revived from an immediate post-war figure of six lone powered-fishing boats to a total of 75 today. The prewar figure on powered-fishing boats was 103 and the annual prewar catch by the Okinawan fishing craft was approxi-



Mass calisthenics are given the school children to help rebuild healthy bodies. The rising tubercular rate has been checked.

mately 10,000,000 pounds. Today the estimated annual catch is 4,000,000 pounds.

MG's educational program began to hit its stride. School tents and quonsets sprang up like mushrooms. New text books and school materials had to be printed or procured. It was a difficult task but one whose efficiency is evidenced by the fact that there are now 202 schools at Okinawa—kindergarten, elementary, high school, agricultural, and civilian training—and 95,289 pupils, a figure comparable to the prewar enrollment.

Under the supervision of LtCol Harvey S. Walseth, Provost Marshal for MG, and commanding officer of the 9th MP Bn which arrived on Okinawa in November, a complete, island-wide Okinawan civilian police system was reestablished.

The culmination of all MG activity occurred with the reestablishment of the Okinawan civilian administration 24 April 1946, and the resumption of a money economy the following week, 1 May.

The evolution of the Okinawan civilian administration began during the very first phases of the war when MG picked certain men to act as "hancho" in the dissemination of MG orders to small groups of people. These "hancho" also acted as foremen of working parties. Then came the selection of mayors for camps which were established. Next was the Provisional Assembly's election in August 1945 of the Okinawan Advisory Council, a group of the island's most competent men, who gave MG invaluable information of the political, economic, and cultural life of the people. This was followed by the election and appointment of district officials in September.

Townships were reestablished when it became

feasible, and headmen appointed. Then, one by one, the administrative departments of the central government were filled by ex-members of the Okinawan Advisory Council, which had been abolished with the actual beginning of the establishment of the Okinawan civilian administration.

Finally there was only one position left to be filled, that of "Chiji," or Chief Okinawan civilian official. MG gathered an advisory assembly of 100 of Okinawa's most capable men and asked them to nominate 3 men, from among which the Deputy Commander for MG would select one as "Chiji." Dignified, 60-year-old Koshin Shikiya, Okinawa's foremost educator and citizen, received 80 per cent of the votes cast and was subsequently appointed the new "Chiji" of Okinawa Gunto by Col Murray.

For the first time since Japan obtained political control of Okinawa, in place of a Japanese-born official, a real, true Okinawan was the chief civilian official of the land. Frankly, the Okinawan people were quite pleased.

With the reestablishment of the Okinawan civilian administration, MG's policy has thus changed from one of direct control of the people to one of indirect control through the civilian

administration, a point at which most military government usually starts.

The monetary economy which was established 1 May 1946 has been modeled on that which existed before the war, and has been directed toward the reintegration of Okinawa Gunto economically with other islands of the Ryukyus chain and the remainder of the Far East.

Agrarian Okinawa, 60 miles long and 5 miles wide, with its 366,000 people has never been a self-sufficient body. Before the war, and at its peak productivity, it was still subsidized 20 per cent by the Japanese government. Under United States' MG control it will have to be subsidized much more until all the bugs are ironed out of its present economic setup.

In mid-November, MG took upon its shoulders an additional burden with the jurisdictional acquisition of the Northern and Southern Ryukyus Island groups and their 400,000-plus people with economic and political problems entirely different from those of relatively vacuum-like Okinawa.

Despite intangibles and unpredictables, MG has moved on, if not speedily at times, doggedly, until today, Okinawa has emerged a bit haggard and wan for the experience, but with a face set to the future.

US MC

The Over-Rated Bayonet

Continued from page 22

mum freedom in handling the rifle, yet could penetrate sufficiently for combat use. The United States still retained the 16-inch knife, Model 1905. The French had replaced their long sword model with a shorter one, though the blade still measured 15 $\frac{3}{4}$ inches. The Germans retained their 39.7 cm sword, weighing 1 pound 4 oz. The Belgians had joined the trend to shorter steel, with a 9 $\frac{1}{2}$ -inch weapon, and the Italians had a dagger model weighing 15 $\frac{1}{4}$ oz. and having a 11 $\frac{3}{4}$ -inch blade. Troops of the Netherlands carried a slender dagger weighing 10 oz. but with a blade almost 19 inches long. Other small nations varied their bayonets to conform to their assorted makes of rifles, though the Czechs used Mausers exclusively and had an 11.8-inch bayonet to match. The Japanese issued a straight, single-edged model with a 15-inch blade, weighing 15 oz. It was said at that time that they spent more time in bayonet training than any other nation.

When war came in the Pacific, with its dug-in, concealed enemy, it promised much for the bayonet. Most of the fighting was definitely at close range, but little of it was done with the bayonet. Even at 15 yards or less a .30 caliber slug is quicker and surer than a foot of rusty

steel. No man with a round in his chamber was bothering to stick the enemy with the blade. The Jap had been highly publicized as a bayonet man, with his long rifle and long blade and his supposed agility afoot. He did use the bayonet on occasion, as he did everything from rocks to rockets, but his favorite occasion usually involved prisoners or civilians. And few Americans in the Pacific ever prodded anything more than a weary bullock hauling mortar ammo on a native cart.

All through history it is clear that a bullet is the quickest, surest weapon an infantryman can use. With the development of magazine and semi- and full-automatic weapons he usually had a bullet ready. He can reinforce it with a pistol and knife. That leaves the bayonet's main value the debatable one of fostering an aggressiveness in recruits. The same end is attained by other forms of combat conditioning, which can be employed on those rare hand-to-hand occasions when you have no ready bullet.

The present American bayonet is smaller than ever before, of almost dagger dimensions. The improvised, cut-down bayonets employed on carbines in the Pacific represent the same trend. It seems just possible that the evolution of the Seigneur de Puysegur's dagger is making a full circle. The bayonet is now back where it began as a glorified knife; it may be on the way to extinction. It's about time.

US MC

"... HATH MURDERED SLEEP"



MACBETH was a novice at murdering sleep compared to the job field artillery did in the past war. Now with not much more to disturb your sleep than the radio next door or some off-key party singing in the neighborhood, you may have forgotten the nights when you wished those damn cannoneers would cease firing and let you get some sleep. Along with numerous other people you may have felt that firing all night long was no way to win friends and influence people. If you ever mentioned this fact to an artilleryman, you probably got his stock answer, "What are you griping about Mac—how'd you like to be out at the other end where they're going off?" Maybe that answer didn't soothe the ire in your warrior's breast, but you had to admit he did have a point.

Everyone liked to hear and see the sound and fury of artillery fire carrying the ball for the infantry during the hours of daylight when the results were visible, but most marines didn't quite understand what all the shooting was about at night—when neither they nor the artillerymen could see anything to shoot at. The answer is not complicated at all—the artilleryman was still carrying the ball at night by means of harassing and interdiction (H&I) fires. He was trying to

By LtCol Frederick P. Henderson

continue to neutralize and destroy the enemy, to lower his combat efficiency a little more, so that the next day's job would be easier for the infantryman.

H&I fires are the artilleryman's answer to darkness and periods of reduced visibility, when he must continue to give support but is deprived of

his observation. Their importance is greatly magnified when we have control of the air and force the

enemy into nocturnal habits. To escape the ever-present eyes of our spotting planes and tactical aircraft he must move, supply, fortify, and conduct all other large scale operations at night. During foul weather, when our planes are grounded, an enemy lacking air superiority will make every effort to take maximum advantage of his temporary equality. The German offensive in the Ardennes and the Japanese withdrawal from the Shuri line at Okinawa are outstanding examples of major enemy operations when we were denied the benefits of air superiority.

If the enemy dares not expose himself in daylight to the eyes of our air and forward observers, we may be certain that he will present artillery targets at night or in periods of poor visibility when he feels safe in leaving his cover.

H&I fires are one of artillery's most important and least understood missions

The importance of denying the enemy this welcomed and necessary freedom of movement is the reason for H&I fires—on which Marine artillerymen were expending from one-fourth to one-third of their ammunition by the end of the war.

Well-planned H&I fires can be a major factor in waging a successful campaign, and therefore are a matter of vital interest to every commander and his staff. But if they turn to their field manuals or textbooks to find the what, why, when, where, and how of H&I fires they will find nothing but a few general statements that do nothing to give them the facts they want. What is said leaves the impression that H&I fires are a minor part of the fire support plan, and a secondary mission for artillery.

Actually, H&I fires are the means by which artillery is able to exert its powerful influence on the battlefield at all times and under all conditions of visibility with positive effect upon the enemy. The results that may be obtained from those fires include: casualties and damage, prevention or disruption of supply by neutralization of supply installations, prevention or disruption of supply and movement by interdiction of road nets, prevention of repair to damage done during daylight, maintenance of counterbattery neutralization, and lowered combat efficiency.

Harassing fires on known troops and materiel targets should do more than just harass in the limited dictionary sense. They must be planned in sufficient volume to assure casualties to personnel in the areas, lowered combat efficiency, and damage to material and supplies. They become, in fact, sustained, unobserved neutralization fires. Fires of this nature should be placed on enemy combat positions, both frontline and reserve, on bivouac areas of enemy reserves, or supply installations and areas, and on command posts.

THE supply system of a large force offers a vulnerable and remunerative target. Through destruction of supplies and neutralization of supply installations we can do much toward defeating combat troops. H&I fires on a supply installation must be in sufficient volume to either keep service troops out of the area or inflict casualties on them and reduce their operating efficiency if they do attempt to work, and also to cause destruction of the supplies in the installation. It doesn't take a very vivid imagination to visualize the casualties, damage, and disruption of supply that a well planned H&I schedule would have caused in some of our beachhead supply installations in the Pacific.

By interdiction fires on road nets we hope to prevent or disrupt the enemy's movement of troops or supplies. If these fires do not either stop normal traffic entirely or create a definite disruptive hazard, they are a waste of ammu-

tion. An occasional round fired haphazardly is no more than a slight annoyance and will not produce results worth keeping cannoneers up to fire the round. A good schedule of interdiction fires must make movement of troops and supplies both difficult and dangerous. We must make the enemy know that he will suffer casualties and lose vehicles and materiel if he attempts to use the roads at night. We must disrupt his movements so much that he never accomplishes what he sets out to do.

H&I fires will prevent the enemy from repairing during darkness the installations we destroyed or damaged during the day. We may not be able to fire on every such place but should definitely do so on those which are of such vital importance to the enemy that he will undoubtedly try to repair them. Of particular importance in this category are key fortifications in his battle position and sensitive points in his routes of transportation (bridges, cuts, fills, etc.)

H&I fires are an important and integral part of counterbattery. They maintain during darkness the neutralization we gain during the day. They cause casualties and damage if the enemy tries to fire, supply, or displace his artillery.

The cumulative effect of the specific results discussed above will be a definite lowering of the enemy's combat efficiency. Prisoners of war in all theaters verified the fact that sustained harassing fires in volume were a major factor in causing combat fatigue with its resultant errors of decision on the part of commanders and staffs, and errors of execution and loss of aggressiveness on the part of troops. Fortunately for us, the Japanese didn't give many of our units any personal experience in effective H&I fires. However, anyone who was on Guadalcanal during the night shellings by Japanese ships can tell you how effective he thinks heavy harassing fires are.

Speed is essential in the planning of H&I fires, as they must always meet the deadline of darkness. Therefore, planning is concurrent in all artillery echelons. The highest echelon present should establish a general policy for H&I fires, coordinate the fires of lower units, and establish definite zones of responsibility for lower units in planning their H&I fires. Final H&I plans are prepared at corps and division artillery levels, incorporating all or part of the recommended H&I plans submitted by subordinate units.

Division artillery should plan all "close support" fires on targets such as enemy battle positions, forward CPs, and other installations that are immediate threats to the division's operations. The zone covered by these fires will normally extend from 3,000 to 5,000 yards beyond the front lines.

Corps artillery should plan all H&I fires be-



Twenty-four hours a day the big 155s on Bougainville pounded the Japanese, preventing their moving up troops or supplies and keeping them from sleep.

yond the division artillery zone of responsibility, all counterbattery fires and all interdictory fires on routes of transportation. Division artillery should request corps artillery to execute fires that require medium or heavy artillery beyond the division artillery's capabilities and recommend interdictory fires in the division artillery zone. Corps artillery may assign certain interdictory and counterbattery fires in the division zone to the division artillery for execution.

In amphibious operations, the corps and division artillery should take maximum advantage of the capabilities of naval gunfire and air support in planning their H&I fires. Naval gunfire can be used effectively to harass area targets and to reinforce artillery fires with main battery calibers. Air support "night-heckler" planes equipped with flares and bombs are a valuable addition to the H&I plan and should be included whenever available. Frequent sorties by such planes will keep the enemy antiaircraft defense continually alerted. Bombs dropped into active areas will interrupt all activity and may cause casualties and damage. Flares will also interrupt activity and may reveal large-scale movement.

Good target information is of prime importance in planning H&I fires. Without it the artillery is literally "shooting-in-the-dark" and cannot hope to achieve the results desired. Each ar-

tillery echelon must exploit every possible source of target information in planning its H&I fires.

Artillery S-2s and S-3s will normally provide the great majority of targets to be fired. After a study of all target information received from artillery intelligence agencies, from the supported unit and from other available sources, the S-2 can prepare a list of the most gainful targets for H&I fire. The S-3 will find that many of the targets fired upon for neutralization or destruction during the day, are desirable H&I targets. These targets possess the additional advantage of having "did hit" firing data available which will add to the effectiveness of the H&I fires.

After a list of H&I targets has been prepared by each artillery echelon, it should be referred to the supported unit to see if there are any additional targets they want harassed or interdicted.

When the targets to be fired upon have been selected, the caliber and number of rounds to be used on each target must be determined. In allotting ammunition the cardinal rule is to allot enough to insure that the desired results are achieved. To fire too little is only a waste of ammunition. It is better to fire on fewer targets with sufficient ammunition to get positive results than to try to cover a multiplicity of targets with an inadequate allotment of ammunition. If you want to wear the enemy down by preventing him from sleeping, you must *keep him awake*.

H&I Fires on Okinawa

DURING the period 1 April to 30 June, 1945, III Corps Artillery fired a total of 74,849 rounds in harassing and interdiction missions. This was 31.5 per cent of the total number of rounds expended and included 25,856 rounds of 155 mm gun and 32,563 rounds of 155 mm howitzer ammunition fired by Corps battalions plus 16,430 rounds of both 105 mm and 155 mm fired by the sometimes-attached 27th Infantry Division Artillery.

During the same period, supporting naval units fired a total of 1,542 H&I missions. This was 41 percent of all naval gunfire support missions and included calibers ranging from 5- to 14-inch naval rifles.

all night long—not just arouse him two or three times. If you want to disrupt his supply system you must keep him out of his supply dumps and off the roads, not just annoy him occasionally.

The general tactical situation will influence the ammunition allotment, as well as the number of H&I fires planned. If the enemy is withdrawing or retreating, fires should be heavy in order to disrupt his movements, inflict casualties and damage, and hasten his demoralization. If the enemy is preparing to attack, our fires should again be heavy to delay and disrupt his movement of troops and supplies, inflict casualties on fresh troops brought up for the attack, and lower the offensive aggressiveness of his troops. Unusually heavy H&I fires should not be planned prior to a friendly attack as they may reveal our intentions to the enemy. Once the attack has been launched, however, H&I fires should be planned to the limit of the ammunition available. On quiet sectors of a front, H&I fires need not be widespread or heavy.

The primary consideration in determining the caliber to be used is whether or not the target to be fired upon is occupied by troops. If it is primarily a troop target, medium or heavy artillery should be used in order to gain greater effect from blast and concussion and to cover the largest possible area with fragments. The more noise and shock you can put into the enemy's position during the night, the less ready for combat will his troops be the following day. The desired effect on this type of target will be realized more fully if the artillery's fire is supplemented by occasional rounds of naval gunfire of 12-inch caliber or larger. The tremendous detonation and concussion of these shells dispel any lingering hopes of rest and sleep the enemy may have had.

When corps and division artillery have selected the targets to be fired upon and determined the caliber and number of rounds to be used on each, they assign the targets to their subordinate battalions for execution. The battalion in turn determines the type ammunition and fuze to be

used on each target, prepares the firing data and the time schedule and assigns the targets to batteries or roving guns for execution.

The H&I time schedule, which shows the time each round or group of rounds is to be fired, is the heart of any H&I plan. If it is not prepared with intelligence and ingenuity the best of previous planning may be rendered ineffective, and the results expected from the H&I plan may not be achieved. In preparing the time schedule it must be constantly kept in mind that the object of the H&I plan is to harass, obstruct, confuse, worry, disrupt, and damage the enemy; to keep him under fire the maximum possible amount of time; and to never let him *know* when the next round is coming, but always keep him *expecting* it. (A battlefield application of waiting for the man upstairs to drop his other shoe.)

For these reasons every effort is made to avoid regularity in the time schedule. The rounds fired in any one hour at a target must be at irregular intervals, and the intervals must vary from hour to hour. To gain the maximum number of firings from the allotted ammunition, the method of fire is usually by single rounds rather than volleys or salvos. Enemy troops will suffer more loss of sleep, more wear and tear on their nerves, and more casualties, if they do not stay undercover, and if we fire our rounds at them one at a time during the hour instead of firing all at once or in groups. The frequent and continual fall of shells will soon develop a "foxhole complex" in his troops. This same principle applies to interdiction fires. An allotted number of rounds fired singly at an important road junction will cause greater disruption of traffic and damage than if they were fired in one or two groups.

Everyone realizes that thundering artillery preparations and timely observed fires are the backbone of the infantry's supporting fires during the day. It is time that H&I fires received overdue recognition for the important part they play during the night in getting the marine with the rifle forward to his objective.

Amphibious Tactics

Continued from page 38

located in limited land areas widely separated across the reaches of the Pacific. Training, mounting, and staging also had to be accomplished from separate locations. Coordination was achieved as a result of the teamwork developed in employing the same forces and the same commanders in a series of successive operations.

Islands and atolls are limited land masses with short shore lines with little choice of landing beaches and where the available beaches are always strongly defended. However, the island can be isolated by the exercise of sea and air superiority and the enemy can be prevented from reinforcing his original defending force. A closely coordinated preparatory bombardment and assault are required to breach the defenses and tactical surprise is therefore forsaken in order to achieve maximum destruction prior to landing. Daylight is required for such operations. It is usually impractical to employ air borne troops.

THE Japanese rarely employed mobile reserves and our tactics called for the employment of mobile weapons for direct fire against strongly fortified positions, light and medium field artillery, extensive naval gunfire throughout ground operations, and the use of aircraft carriers and escort carriers as mobile bases from which very close air support was delivered. Landing force organization was designed to permit the independent functioning of small units in the assault. Landing force equipment was light; heavy artillery was not required in assault shipping, and individual equipment was kept at a minimum. There were long lines of communication ending usually in a ship-to-shore operation. There were reefs to be crossed and the resulting need for tracked vehicles, such as the LVT. An adequate shore party organization had to be devised to maintain the flow of supplies from the ships to the fighting troops. Modern harbor facilities were almost never available. Roads, airfields, and other advanced base facilities all had to be constructed after the ground had been captured. There was the additional problem of replacing the heavy landing force casualties which had to be expected in the assault landings.

The various techniques required to solve the particular problems in the two areas were largely solved by commanders in the theaters. The fundamental tenets of our landing operations doctrine were the basis for all amphibious tactics employed. The concept for command relations,

methods for gaining intelligence, manner of coordinating planning, training and execution, attack force and transport organization, landing force organization, transport loading, debarkation, ship-to-shore movement, amphibious communications and control, underwater demolition activity, naval gunfire techniques, and shore party functioning were common to both European and Pacific landings and far outweighed local differences. The training of amphibious forces in the United States for employment in both Europe and the Pacific was based on that doctrine, and the lessons learned in combat in one area were rapidly applied in planning subsequent operations in both.

FROM our first landings at Guadalcanal, it was apparent that our tactics were sound. Development during the war consisted of the following:

1. Learning where to place emphasis in our training and application of the doctrine.
2. Refining and perfecting existing techniques.
3. Developing new techniques (e.g. the Joint Assault Signal Company, Air Support Control, and Underwater Demolition Teams) for old problems and new equipment (e.g. radar, amphibious flagships, and escort aircraft carriers) and integrating them with the basic doctrine.
4. Learning that no matter how sound our tactics were, they were ineffective unless applied with aggressive vigor and resourcefulness by dynamic, intelligent, and well-informed commanders and highly trained and disciplined troops.
5. Increasing coordination and efficiency as we gained combat experience. In this manner we learned how to land more troops and material on the beach in a shorter time and with less loss.

The progress of our amphibious offensives in the field depended on research and experiment, production, procurement and training at the amphibious training bases, established by the Navy on both coasts, in the United States.

We learned lessons in every landing operation, and just as the strategic position gained by one victory permitted successive operations, just as our capture of Tarawa, Kwajalein, and Eniwetok put us in position to take Saipan, Tinian, and Guam; so the lessons we learned in one landing made possible our successes in later ones. This was a continuous and cumulative process which transcended the limits of any particular theater or campaign. The value of Tarawa's lessons was realized equally at Saipan and Normandy. This wartime development of amphibious tactics fell into four main periods: August 1942-August 1943, September 1943-December 1943, January 1944-July 1944, August 1944-August 1945.

To be continued



To the Editor

The GAZETTE wants its readers to use these pages as a discussion center for pet theories, battle lessons, training expedients, rebuttals, and what have you. Correspondents should include their name, rank, and address, but the signature will be withheld if requested.

Retort Courteous . . .

DEAR EDITOR:

I read with interest and enjoyed *What Good is a Pistol?* which was an answer to my previous article on a similar theme. Maj Cooper is a bit rough on some of my theorizing and I feel compelled to come to my own defense on several points . . . my main idea was that the Marine assault infantry-man needs a pistol as a supplementary weapon. My other contention was that our present pistol does not fulfill this need adequately but until a better one comes along let's use what we have to the best advantage.

Since my article was submitted the report of the Army Ground Forces Board Number 3, the old Infantry Board . . . has been published and should be very pertinent to this discussion. This report was rendered about VJ Day and when its restricted classification was lifted it was published in the *American Rifleman* for June 1946. The report discusses at length various proposals for improving the pistol and concludes . . . "the following comments apply to a military pistol after the present stocks of M1911 and M1911A1 pistols require replacement:

"Recommendation. The Board recommends:

"a. That the trigger cocking feature be incorporated in military pistols at such time as other factors require a pistol redesign, but this trigger-cocking feature alone be not considered as requiring or justifying pistol redesign.

"b. That research be conducted toward developing a pistol mechanism to eject manually and replace a defective cartridge by pulling the trigger.

"c. That the present caliber .45 be retained.

"d. That balance, weight, size, and accuracy of the M1911A1 be considered adequate.

"e. That a holster weapon based on the M2 carbine, equipped with a wire folding stock, with shortened barrel, be developed for individuals requiring a weapon of greater compactness than the standard

carbine, greater range than the pistol, and capable of penetrating body armor."

Between Maj Cooper and the AGF Board, I seem to be over-ruled on my ideas for the ideal pistol as to caliber and some points of design. Perhaps I gave the impression that I was selling the .45 short. I bow my head in shame for having, even erroneously, been a party to such a heresy. The .45 is still the best in my book. One of its salient features, which I negligently failed to mention but which Maj Cooper wisely points out, is its utter reliability. . . . I am also taken to task for my use of the term "sufficient shock power," the implication being that it was used loosely and inadvisedly. I used this term because, after all, shock power and its effects are relative. Too much depends on the person shot; his physical characteristics, condition and psychology for example, as well as just where the bullet hits him. The .45 thus came back into vogue when it was found that the low powered .38 then in use was not stopping the fanatical Moros during the Philippine Insurrection. At the other extreme a .22 could conceivably stop a man under favorable circumstances. Most armies, having to contend with neither fanatics nor weaklings, have arrived at a compromise cartridge of about .35 caliber. . . . If, as Maj Cooper believes, a double row, higher capacity magazine can be adapted to the .45 without making the grip too large and the slight difference in size and weight is disregarded, then we can combine most of our desirable features in a pistol and still have it .45 caliber.

Bull's eyes to Maj Cooper for his timely and pertinent treatment of the deficiency in pistol training. . . . Definitely, provision should be made for more of the type of training Maj Cooper outlines. It should be preceded by basic bull's eye work, however, and should include all small arms firing, not just the pistol. . . .

In dismissing my "two gun concept" as unsound, Maj Cooper makes a number of statements which shouldn't come from a self-styled "pistol bug" such as he. . . . I question his argument to the extent that I will bet my last pearl handled .45 against the pistol he had at the age of 12 that if he led a platoon to "take that hill" he would be carrying his favorite pistol plus his carbine, and the extra weight be hanged.

BROOKE NIHART,
Major, USMC.

Suspicious . . .

. . . Maj Cooper swings from the deck although not always true to the mark. By the way, what was he doing with a pistol at the tender age of 12? Was he a juvenile delinquent?

Improve the Training . . .

DEAR SIR:

A different type of training should be adopted by the military forces if they intend to retain the pistol, Maj John D. Cooper says in "What Good is a Pistol," in your September issue. I thoroughly agree.

My opinion on this subject is based on an unusual variety of experience:

1. The old Navy pistol course back in World War I days. Very different from the present Navy course, it had the following good points:

Used the 20-inch target "B" bull's eye, instead of the smaller one which is so discouraging to beginners nowadays.

Included the prone position and the squatting position, using the steady two-hand hold, the left hand supporting the right. This squatting position, facing the target squarely, both feet flat on the ground, elbows over the knees, is in my opinion the best pistol position there is. It can be gotten into as quickly as a pistol can be drawn, reduces the size of the target presented to the enemy, and produces extremely accurate shooting.

The old Navy course also included the usual one-hand standing position. As a whole, it was practical, encouraging instead of discouraging. However, it did not include everything needed.

2. Naturally I have had my quota of experience with the Marine Corps and Army qualification course.

3. During World War II, I served with the OSS, which had adopted the pistol training methods of LtCol Fairbairn of the British Army.

Fairbairn had been deputy commissioner of the International Police at Shanghai and developed his "close combat" pistol shooting style there. It is unaimed or semi-aimed.

He also teaches two special positions, good for aimed or semi-aimed fire. One is the two-handed standing position, facing the target squarely, shoulders drawn back to add steadiness. This is much easier and more accurate than the usual standing position.

The other is the "post rest," back of left forearm against post, tree, or building corner, left hand supporting the right. This position gives cover, is very steady, accurate, and practical.

Fairbairn looked with contempt on the usual target style of pistol shooting, said his methods saved his men's lives at Shanghai and enabled them to kill the other fellow. In general, he maintained that the

pistol is a short-range weapon, with which speed is more essential than extreme accuracy.

After being trained by Fairbairn and trying out his methods, I decided he went too far in the opposite direction from our methods. I then combined the methods in giving pistol training to about 1,500 soldiers, sailors, and civilians in the OSS.

We gave them the following training, which makes up about the most all-round pistol course I have heard of.

1. The army preliminary training, practice, and qualification course on "L" targets cut down like those at Quantico.

2. The Fairbairn "close combat" training and firing course, consisting of unaimed or semi-aimed fire at varying ranges and under varying conditions, using silhouette targets.

3. A special course, including the Fairbairn special positions and elements of the old Navy course. This included slow and rapid aimed fire, using two hands in five positions—standing, sitting, squatting, prone, and standing with a post rest.

As all these positions are steady and accurate, we used the "L" target without any danger of discouragement.

This combination of three stages—standard, Fairbairn and special—is not presented as the perfect answer to the pistol training problem, but it may contain some ideas.

At least, we made an honest effort to prepare men for any emergency they could meet with a pistol, whether speed or extreme accuracy was more important under the particular circumstances. It is doubtful any men had more complete pistol training during the war than these OSS men did.

As Maj Cooper says, unless men receive more thorough and practical training the pistol should be discarded. The present military pistol style is artificial, designed for the target range rather than for combat.

ALBERT H. JENKINS,
Major, USMCR.

FBI Course . . .

DEAR EDITOR:

If the Marine Corps is really interested in developing a practical pistol course it need look no farther than the FBI Academy at Quantico. This is supposedly the quintessence of police-type gun-fighting. Perhaps it is also the answer to close-combat pistol training. Why not take an average group of marines, run them through the course, and then compare the results by firing them through a combat reaction course with another average group of marines who have had only the conventional bull's eye training?

PAUL MACALISTAIR,
Captain, USMC.

The Fourth Marines at Corregidor

Continued from page 18

ters and who was inspecting the third deck to see that no marines were left there.

The island was well plastered in the raid; a freighter, anchored off the little dock was hit and belched flames and smoke, and the tiny narrow-gauge railway was damaged.

The raid on the 29th lasted much of the day; after it was over, the Regiment dispersed to beach defense positions all over the tadpole-shaped island.

Col Howard reported, as ordered, to MajGen G. F. Moore, commanding the harbor defenses of Manila and Subic Bays and of Fort Mills (Corregidor). Gen Moore appointed Col Howard commanding officer of the beach defenses, Corregidor, relieving LtCol D. Ausmus, CAC, whose defense dispositions, because of lack of personnel, had had to be largely paper ones.

Col Ausmus became artillery officer for the beach defenses, and the following organization was established:

East Sector—From Malinta Hill (inclusive) to the tail of the island; 1st Bn, 4th Marines, LtCol Curtis T. Beecher, commanding—20 officers, 367 enlisted.

Middle Sector—From Malinta Hill (exclusive) to a line from Morrison Hill (inclusive) to Government Ravine (inclusive) 3d Bn (less detachment); LtCol John P. Adams, commanding 20 officers, 490 enlisted.

West Sector—From a line running from Morrison Hill to Government Ravine (both exclusive) to the west end of the island—2d Bn; LtCol Herman R. Anderson, commanding 18 officers, 324 enlisted.

General Reserve—Bivouac area—Government Ravine—Headquarters and Service Co (less detachments); Maj Max W. Schaeffer, commanding, 8 officers, 183 enlisted.

"Battalion messes were established in each sector and the General Reserve area," Col Howard reported, "and work on beach defenses initiated by 4th Marine personnel."

A CONSIDERABLE amount of work had been done on the West and Middle Sectors before the Marines reached Corregidor, but very little in the vulnerable East Sector, except for concrete trenches along a so-called "final defense line" on the east side of Malinta Hill. Artillery and machine gun positions had to be relocated; many new ones established, and the marines turned to on the back-breaking toil of stringing miles of barbed wire, building bomb chutes over the cliffs, placing makeshift land mines, digging foxholes and establishing trench lines.

From 30 December until the end the marines bivouaced, messed, slept, and worked in the foxholes, caves, trenches and beach defenses to which they were assigned.

"During the months of January, February and March," Col Howard later reported, "a tremendous amount of engineering work was accomplished in spite of at least five daily air raids, and from about 7 February on, artillery shelling from the Cavite shore. Over 20 miles of barbed wire was strung in the East Sector alone. Tank traps and barriers, land mines, water mines, cable barriers in the North and South Dock inlets, trenches, dugouts, tunnels, gun emplacements having concrete splinter proof roofs, interior and switch positions, final defense lines in sectors, cleared "fields of fire" and anti-parachute defenses were constructed.

Only a few hardy souls maintained their bivouacs in the wrecked Middleside Barracks. Maj Reginald H. Ridgely, Jr., who throughout the siege performed logistical prodigies, had dispersed the Regiment's supplies all over the Rock in small dumps—"the only answer to the intensive aerial bombings of the enemy." One of these dumps was located in the Middleside Barracks, and QM Clerk Ferguson and a number of his QM personnel took up quarters on the first floor of the half-ruined barracks.

CORREGIDOR, a rugged, rocky island, with three high hills—the highest rising to 550 feet—and a low flat tadpole-shaped "tail" to the east, is about four miles long and a mile and a half wide at its extremities. It was covered at the beginning of the siege with tropic verdure, and it stood out green and glowing against the lovely background of Manila Bay. The Rock was famous as a fortress, but it was built in the days when the plane was not a menace, and, like Singapore, its designers had anticipated that the main assault would come from the sea—not from the nearby shores of Bataan. Its coast defense guns—up to 12 inches in size, supplemented by the 14-inch guns of Fort Drum and Fort Frank on the nearby islets—El Fraile and Carabao—were rather well sited to repel an attack by naval vessels, but were of little use against land targets⁶. Its 3-inch antiaircraft guns, with an obsolescent fire control system, were too few, too small, and too old to be very effective against modern, high-flying bombers.

Above all, the island's water supply was totally inadequate, and much of it came by barges from

⁶According to "General Wainwright's Story," Corregidor was "armed with two modern 12-inch rifles; about a dozen 12-inch mortars; a few 10-inch disappearing guns (which could fire only out to sea); some 8-inch disappearing guns (also unable to be turned either toward Bataan or Cavite); several 155 mm guns similarly handicapped; four batteries of mobile 155 mm guns; several small batteries of 3-inch guns able only to protect our minefields, and forty-eight field guns of 75 mm caliber which were strung along the beaches."

Concerning the Author . . .



THIS SERIES really got its start last spring when Hanson W. Baldwin sensed that there was a great and untold story in the hitherto obscured exploits of the 4th Marines in the Philippines. The story was origi-

nally written for the New York Times Magazine, but so much significant material had been unearthed that Mr. Baldwin wanted to do a more comprehensive article, including the semi-technical detail that a newspaper couldn't use. Working closely with him in the collection and evaluation of research materials was Col Donald Curtis, exec of the famous regiment during its

last campaign. Col Curtis suggested the GAZETTE. So the Times received a story tailored for popular consumption and the GAZETTE got an expanded version for its military readers.

Mr Baldwin's work on the piece was interrupted by a visit to the Pacific to attend the A-bomb tests. He is military editor of the New York Times, which means that he is about tops in his field.

A native of Baltimore he graduated from the Naval Academy in 1924. Three years' service and he resigned in order to travel and write. He was with the Baltimore Sun briefly, then joined the Times.

One of the best military analysts and commentators, he has written half a dozen books, contributed to several more, and has appeared in practically all leading magazines. He has also done motion picture and radio work. He covered both the Pacific and European wars, winning the Pulitzer Prize for a series of articles on the South Pacific theater in the fall of 1942.

Sisiman Cove on Bataan. The power plant was too small and was exposed—above ground—to enemy attack, and communication wires were strung on the surface or so close to the surface that they were severed repeatedly by enemy shells and bombs. Moreover, contrary to popular reports, there were no gun galleries cut into the solid rock; nearly all of the main battery positions were open and exposed—protected only by concrete barbettes or sand bags.

Malinta Tunnel, which was gouged by a far-seeing general through the 400 foot mass of Malinta Hill, gave a protected route of access from the eastern to the western portions of Corregidor. A small railroad ran through it. Tunnel laterals opening off it, provided protected hospital space, ammunition stowage, and headquarters and communications offices. These laterals took their names from the activities housed in them; *viz*—the “Ordnance Lateral,” etc.

There were initially considerable supplies of food and of ammunition, but fresh foods were very scarce; there was the monotony of sameness about the diet, and there were acute shortages of AA ammunition and large antipersonnel mortar shells.

Corregidor, in other words, was vulnerable and the marines knew it.

FROM 29 December on through the early days of January, the Rock was bombed almost continuously. Most of the buildings were smashed;

the island's little railroad was torn up; Btry Smith (12-inch guns, barbette carriage), and Btry Way (12-inch mortars) were damaged, and several supply dumps damaged or burned. Between 7 and 11 January there was a brief lull in the bombing attacks—with intermittent raids thereafter, but with alarms or raids several times a day. The AA gunners did their best, but the Japs sometimes flew out of range, and at best there were only a few seconds when the guns bore. But it was comforting to the defenders' morale to hear the sharp bark of the “sky” guns, and occasionally—remarkably often, considering the obsolescent guns, ammunition and fire control—a Jap bomber plummeted into the Bay, or disappeared behind the hills of the mainland, trailing smoke.

In late January, a submarine—one of several to run the blockade—brought in 3,000 rounds of AA ammunition and took out 20 tons of gold and silver—still paradoxically precious in the eyes of government, even when men were dying and wasting away.

On the Rock, the marines worked and sweated, grew lean and bronzed and tense; at nearly any point on the island, there was a bomb crater within 25 yards.

In mid-January, things were not going well on Bataan. Much of the food intended for the frontline troops never reached them; some of it was diverted by undisciplined Filipino QM truck drivers (of the Philippine Army) to some

of the 60,000 Filipino civilian refugees who had taken shelter behind our lines on Bataan. The Jap pressure—though not large-scale—was constant; there was little sleep; morale was dropping. That mixed assortment of the I and II Corps—Regular Army, National Guardsmen, Filipinos—were beginning to understand they were cut off, isolated. . . .

"Where the hell's the Navy?"

"What's the matter back home?"

On Bataan, in mid-January, the end was not yet, but the men were beginning to see dimly the despairing visage of defeat.

So one of the most controversial orders in history was issued:

Fort Mills, P. I.,
Jan. 15, 1942.

Subject: Message from General MacArthur

To: All Unit Commanders.

"The following message from Gen MacArthur will be read and explained to all troops. Every company commander is charged with personal responsibility for the delivery of this message. Each headquarters will follow up to insure reception by every company or similar unit.

"Help is on the way from the United States. Thousands of troops and hundreds of planes are being dispatched. The exact time of arrival of reinforcements is unknown as they will have to fight their way through Japanese attempts against them. It is imperative that our troops hold until these reinforcements arrive.

"No further retreat is possible. We have more troops in Bataan than the Japanese have thrown against us; our supplies are ample; a determined defense will defeat the enemy's attack.

"It is a question now of courage and determination. Men who run will merely be destroyed but men who fight will save themselves and their country.

"I call upon every soldier in Bataan to fight in his assigned position, resisting every attack. This is the only road to salvation. If we fight we will win; if we retreat we will be destroyed.

MACARTHUR'

By command of General MacArthur"

The order briefly raised the hopes of some but was an ultimate depressant—since its promise of aid could never be kept. Capt John W. Clark wrote that "by the middle of January it

had become apparent that ours was a holding scrap out here, with no hope of reinforcement or aid. . . ."

And soon others saw this was so; even the marines on Corregidor felt an ominous sense of foreboding.

On the Rock they scanned the skies and the tropic seas to westward, but the only planes they saw bore the "fried egg" insignia of Japan upon their wings, and the only reinforcements they received were the casuals and the stragglers, the broken units of Bataan, and the bloody wounded, crowding now into the tunnel laterrals of Malinta.

IN early February, the Japanese commenced intermittent shelling of Corregidor with 105s and later with 150s and 240s emplaced on high ground on the Cavite shore. For days, the bombardments were regular as clock work; the Japs took advantage of the rising sun and morning haze, so that it was difficult to spot their gun positions. The air raids—more sporadic and less dangerous than the shelling—halted briefly, and when they resumed a gallant but vain attempt to increase Corregidor's antiaircraft effectiveness was made by fusing the 670-pound shells of the island's 12-inch mortars with the AA mechanical fuze.

The marines accustomed themselves to the new bombardment, but meal hours became more irregular, and the shadows deepened across the furrowed rocky face of Corregidor and the lined faces of its defenders. The work increased—for ordnance repairmen, medicos, signal corps, QMs.

"Telephone communications were always out after the initial shelling prior to 10 each day." Col Stephen M. Mellnik of the Coast Artillery wrote. "Communication sections would repair the lines by midnight, and by 10 the following day the lines would be out again. . . ."

THE 4th Regiment was no longer the trim, spruce outfit that had won the applause of thousands along the Shanghai Bund just a few short weeks before. Bombing and bombardment had etched deep lines in their faces, and their bellies were never full. The lack of vitamin A in their diet gave them night blindness; the sentries stumbled in the darkness. The marines slept rolled in blankets in their foxholes, shaved when they could and many bathed at night by crawling through the barbed wire of the beach defenses and swimming in the salt, oil-flecked waters of the bay. The 2d Platoon of Co A found a spring near Cavalry Point, but it was the dry season and its waters quickly gave out.

As the days went by the 4th Marines absorbed more and more casuals and stragglers. Filipino

mess boys called back to active service from the Fleet Reserve, some members of the Philippine Army Air Corps, bluejackets who had lost their ships, and army personnel who had lost their batteries—all these were assimilated into the beach defenses of Corregidor, and trained by the 4th Marines.

The back-breaking program of strengthening the beach defenses with man-made obstacles was followed day after day, despite continuous bombardment.

Robert F. Jenkins, Jr., now a lieutenant colonel, then a first lieutenant and CO of the 2d Platoon of Co A, recalled those terrible hours of endurance in the "hot sultry days" when the marines, dispersed thinly at beach defense positions, tried to strengthen the defenses of an island already doomed.

"Dummy positions were constructed to trick the enemy. We stretched out what little barbed wire we had along the rocky beaches," Col Jenkins reported.

"The beaches were covered with debris and oil washed ashore from bombed ships and barges in Manila Bay. We found life preservers, lumber, pieces of life boats, empty crates, a rotting piece of a human arm, and, strangely enough, several wooden rifles. A partially damaged barge loaded with cans of corned beef, tomatoes and dried fruit drifted ashore. We salvaged what we could and added to our battalion stores. . . .

"When we finished our thin line of defensive positions along the beach, we started preparing positions in depth. We didn't have the men to man them—yet! They were for the men who were to come. The help that was on the way!

"As we got more barbed wire, we added to our barricades. We made double apron fences from our single ones, but still could have used more.

"We dug tank traps with pick and shovel. We took care of our tools like precious gems. It was almost impossible to replace them and the ground was rocky and rough on them. We made Molotov bombs out of old bottles filled with a mixture of oil and gasoline. . . .

"There were less sand

bags than we needed to build positions. We collected discarded powder cans of all sizes from 3-inch to 12-inch ones. These were filled with dirt and used in place of sand bags. They were not as good but added more protection.


"On Cavalry Point beach there were the remains of a large store of gasoline. Jap bombs had hit it in one of the early raids and fire had destroyed all the gasoline which had been stored there in 50-gallon drums. There were great heaps of rusty exploded drums. We made tank obstacles out of some of these drums, filling them with dirt and rock and emplacing them on the approaches from the beach.

" . . . the Army had dumped a number of small size personnel bombs near B Company's positions. We planned to use these, too, if necessary. At places where there were high cliffs above the narrow, rocky beaches on the south shore wooden chutes were constructed so that when the bombs slid down the chute they would burst on the rocks below. . . ."

Some of the defense positions had to be hacked with bolo knives out of the thick jungle vegetation, for Corregidor at the beginning of the siege, was densely overgrown. Monkeys who pilfered soap and flashlights chattered and swung from the long lianas, and there were even a few small deer on the island. But they died quickly beneath the shells and bombs, and the deer provided a welcome addition to a meagre diet.

A rifle range was built on which to train the

Old-model 12-inch coast defense guns were well-situated to repel a naval attack, but were little use against land targets.





"Gibraltar of the East" as seen from the air over East Point.

green recruits from other services. A range and even rudimentary training in the care of a rifle were badly needed, for many of the recruits from Corregidor were that in truth. The Filipinos, armed with Enfield rifles, used their old training-type gas mask cases as musette bags, and they had no idea of rifle maintenance. Some of the rifles were so clogged with dirt before the marines commenced their training program that cleaning rods could scarcely be forced through the bores. But rifle practice was not to last for long. The Japanese shelling became too accurate.

Reconnaissance patrols familiarized the Fourth's officers with every foot of the Rock. During the day many of the officers and non-coms carried out their regular duties, and in late afternoon and early evening the training program—in elementary combat principles—was conducted. Some units varied this routine; infantry combat tactics by squad, platoon, and company were taught in the mornings; foxholes were dug in the afternoons; officers' schools were conducted at night. It was a grim schedule. Each night the beaches had to be guarded—and always there were the shells and the bombs. Enough sleep, like food, was a dim memory.

ON Bataan, as the weeks dragged on, the field hospitals were full; many of the patients mumbled in the grip of the shivering ague and the hot delirium of malaria. Dengue and dysentery were spreading; sleeplessness and hopelessness and hunger made potential victims of all of the Army of Bataan. Sleeplessness was part of the Japanese pattern; all night long the tropic dark flickered with the lightning of the guns and the detonation of the enemy's heavy mortar shells murdered rest.

There was little reflection of this situation in the papers in the States. The official communiques spoke vaguely of "heavy Jap losses." The headquarters of Gen MacArthur on Corregidor—in an announcement broadcast throughout the world—pictured LtGen Masaharu Homma—then the Japanese commander of the forces besieging Luzon (who was actually executed for war crimes after the Japanese defeat four years later) as dying under a *hari-kari* knife, "disgraced by his defeats."

There was—as the weeks went on—no mention in the communiques and press releases of the Marines, and

when at last a radio from Corregidor casually named them, the Navy Department had to assure the people of the United States that the Fourth had been in the Philippines all along, and that this belated mention of Marines did not mean that the Fleet had broken through the Jap blockade and landed reinforcements. So widespread was the American illusion that Bataan and Corregidor were doing pretty well, with the Japs on the receiving end, that broadcasts from the States—cast in a cheerful mood of utter unreality—depressed the morale of the beleaguered men of the Philippines who heard them. The marines on Corregidor usually listened in about 1800 each evening to Station KGEI, broadcasting from the West Coast of "God's Country." This station had a particularly brash commentator, who flexed his muscles for the benefit of the Japanese, 10,000 miles away, and one night incautiously defied the enemy:

"I dare you to bomb Corregidor!"

The marines' epithets were unprintable; perhaps one old China hand put it best:

"I wish I had that s. o. b. in my foxhole."

To be continued

The communique from Bataan on 8 March, 1942, said: "From various sources hitherto regarded as reliable Gen. MacArthur has received persistent reports that Lieut. Gen. Masaharu Homma, commander in chief of the Japanese forces in the Philippines, committed *hara-kiri*." ***

"The funeral rites of the late Japanese commander, the reports state, were held on Feb. 26 in Manila." ***

"An interesting and ironic detail of the story is that the suicide and funeral rites occurred in the suite at the Manila hotel occupied by General MacArthur prior to the evacuation of Manila. General MacArthur advises that he is continuing his efforts to secure further evidence of the truth or falsity of the reports."

The communique next day, March 9, 1942, said:

"The new commander in chief of the Japanese forces in the Philippines is Gen. Tomoyuki Yamashita *** General Yamashita succeeds General Homma, who is reported to have committed suicide."

The Marines in the Pacific War

Continued from page 28

the first can be referred the general information that the Imperial Staff had decided to take the Solomons campaign seriously and was committing heavy forces there. The groups built round *Wasp*, *Saratoga*, and *Enterprise* were accordingly held in the area south of the Solomons and another carrier group with *Hornet* at its center was dispatched from Pearl Harbor. The actual discovery of the enemy was a piece of luck—a long range search plane from Espiritu Santo got well off its course 250 miles west and north of Guadal and sighted Kawaguchi's transports on the morning of the 23rd without itself being seen.

The *Hornet* had not yet joined and the *Wasp*, low on both fuel and provision, was on her way back to base. Adm Fletcher came dashing north and got off a strike against the transports that had been seen in the afternoon, the 23rd. It missed them; they had changed course westward when a Jap sub in the area had reported American carrier type planes going over. The point where the transports had been seen was so far westward that the strike missed the Jap fleet too. The planes went into Henderson Field, where the pilots spent an uncomfortable night getting what sleep they could in the seats of their machines while a Jap sub shelled the place. Fletcher had no doubt whatever that the enemy would keep on coming. The fact that he had lost track of them represented some trick which he could not exactly fathom as yet. Accordingly he worked steadily northward through the morning of the 24th, but made poor fleet speed because the wind was wrong and every time he took in or sent out planes he had to turn around and so lose mileage.

About the time the Kawanishi was getting off its final report his scouts found the Japs in two groups, spread all over the ocean, *Saratoga* and *Enterprise* flew off strikes and the Marines at Henderson Field were alerted so their dive bombers came out also. The net result was the triple air battle known as that of the Eastern Solomons.

Over Guadalcanal the fighters of 223, a very hot squadron indeed, crucified the dual attack. They lost three planes but they shot down 11 Zero fighters, five of the Rabaul twin engine bombers and five of *Ryujo*'s bombing planes, and landed on the field hilarious and shouting. Capt Marion E. Carl, who had been at Midway, was one of them: he remarked that although there seemed no difference in the flying of these Japs and those, "We got shot up a lot more there than we do here."

At sea the Jap striking force concentrated on *Enterprise* and she got hit—three times, with 169

casualties and was out of action for a while. The Japs paid for that attack with 82 planes, mostly shot down by our fighters, though the battleship *North Carolina*, covering the carrier, knocked down ten or twelve and drove off several more which did not dare come through the curtain of fire she put up. It was the first suggestion our people had that the Jap pilots were no longer as good as those of Coral Sea and Midway.

Of our own strikers most of the *Enterprise* planes missed the the Japs altogether under clouds. The marines and *Saratoga* men all found targets, but not all the same targets. The Marine groups got in on a heavy cruiser and punched her hard; the *Saratoga* men put a 1,000-pounder into a battleship and hit *Shokaku* twice. First prize, however, belonged to the *Saratoga* men who found the *Ryujo*. They hit her with three big bombs and two torpedoes and left her burning brightly in the fading light. "She sank altogether too quickly," remarked one of the Japanese officers later. Moreover their whole fleet got very few of its planes back. The big carriers had altered course so violently in getting away from our strikes that they could not be reached and *Ryujo*, which was supposed to take in the planes for them, was gone.

The net result of the battle then was that on the evening of 24 August the 1st Fleet found itself not only unable to give air cover to Kawaguchi's transports but even without any for itself in the face of several highly functional carriers which would certainly come tearing north against them next morning. The Admiral ordered the whole fleet back to Truk. The transports were directed to the Shortland Islands under escort of Southeast Area Fleet units, where the Kawaguchi Brigade would be transferred to smaller craft to enter Guadalcanal in more normal fashion. There had reached the Shortlands some of the big power barges, with dished-out bows for beach work, which had been found so useful in China and the Malayan campaign. They had the great advantage to be able to conceal themselves by day from American aerial observation among the deeply-indented shores of the Solomons.

III

GEN Kawaguchi's troubles in getting his troops to Guadalcanal were not yet over. All during the battle the Kuma group had continued its plodding progress in slow transports toward the island. Under the peculiar Japanese system of war what happens to another commander in the same area is not allowed to modify the obligation of any officer to carry out his orders to the letter. It would seem that the commodore conducting the Kuma group under escort of the cruiser *Jintsu* and four destroyers, never received any orders to turn towards the

Shortlands as the rest of the transports had. He must have known about the battle—all the radio channels in the Pacific were full of it—but he never thought of asking for a change in orders either; that would not be *Bushido*. Therefore he kept on; dawn of 25 August found him coming right along toward the strait between Florida and Santa Isabel. The marine planes from Guadal, out on the track of the retreating Jap fleet stumbled on him there, instantly turned to on the little group, beat the be-jesus out of one of the transports and got a heavy bomb on *Jintsu* forward.

Having his biggest ship badly damaged absolved the Jap commodore from continuing the direct line of his orders. He turned the transports towards the Shortlands, sent *Jintsu* back to Truk and dropped the destroyer *Mutsuki* behind to pick up survivors from the sinking troopship. While she was about it a flight of B-17s, alerted by the Marines, came over and found both ships stationary targets. They hit *Mutsuki* with a whole trainload of bombs and down she went. Her skipper, Comdr Hatano, was picked up from a raft later, very much disgusted; his was the first ship sunk by the high level bombers in the whole war. "I suppose even a B-17 has to hit something sometime," he said, "but why did it have to be me?"

On the island Gen Vandegrift had not misinterpreted the effort that failed amid all this thunder in the skies. It meant that the Japs were to make a renewed attempt on his position with heavier forces than before. Accordingly on 21 August, the very first day when he had air cover for the job, he brought the remaining battalion of the 5th Regiment over from Tulagi and installed it as a reserve behind his position on the Matanikau.

On the 27th, as soon as it was clear that the fleet operations were at least temporarily over, the 1st Bn, 5th Marines, was sent to make a renewed landing at Kokumbona and clean out the remaining Japs on that flank by means of a backward sweep toward the Matanikau.

It would seem that not over a single destroyer-load (150 men) of Col Oka's command of the Kawaguchis had arrived by this time, if that many; there may have been no reinforcements at all. The battalion got ashore at 0700 and began moving eastward about noon. Fifteen hundred yards along the beach, the leading company came under machine gun and mortar fire and settled down to a fire fight. At 1500 the battalion reported back to Division that they were pinned down, requested that they be withdrawn by landing craft.

Gen Vandegrift thought this unnecessary, sent the regimental commander up to take over the

operation. It was too late when he got there so the battalion bivouacked for the night and at dawn conducted a flanking movement along the ridges. Too late; the Japs had decamped, leaving 20 bodies, and the operation could be counted a failure.

THE moon was full during those last days of August and the nights brilliant. Maj Charles L. Fike, the air officer, made an effort to keep one or two planes up to see what the enemy was doing on the water. At midnight on the 30th one of these planes spotted two cruisers and a pair of destroyers down near Taiyu Point, lying close in and stopped. Mangrum's dive-bombers booted out to attack them; no contact in the dark. Next night there were three destroyers there; and meanwhile the day patrol planes had discovered near the southern tip of Santa Isabel and under an admirable system of camouflage, a whole nest of big barges. The planes bombed; some of the boats burned but there was no fire nor any sign of Japs, nor was there any when another batch of boats was found and attacked near the same place on 3 September. The latter group had some big ones in it, 70-footers; it began to become clear that the Japs were moving down in this manner by night, hiding out during the day. Not very much could be done to interrupt them without real naval control of the channel.

It was, then, a question of getting them after they landed. Since a patrol had confirmed the intimation from the airmen that the main enemy concentration was being built up east of the airfield that was the place to get them. The General had brought over Edson's Raiders from Tulagi. Now he attached what was left of the Parachutists to them for a raid on this new nest of Japs, but there was a problem about transport. Taiyu was some 20 miles down the coast from our lines, too far for Higgins boats if any surprise were to be attained, and besides Col Edson wanted the gunnery support that APDs could give. But persuading Adm Turner to release APDs for a daylight job was not easy and this was the reason:

He had only six of these valuable ships in the South Pacific command. On 30 August one of them, *Colhoun*, had just been unloading some rations at Lunga when a flight of Jap bombers came over. There were only four fighters operational at the field that afternoon (there had been a heavy air battle in which 18 Japs were shot down, but all except these four of our planes were so damaged that they could not take off) so the Japs had no opposition. Probably they did not know this; they ducked into some low-



Kawaguchi decided to delay the attack till it could receive the support of all the guns.

hanging clouds and began to drop bombs in the general direction of *Colhoun*, which got underway. One of the bombs hit her on the stern and blew it all apart; then another one got her and she sank in a few minutes. Actually it had been a lucky hit, a freak of the first order which would never again be repeated, but of course Turner could not know this at the time. What he did know was that *Colhoun* was gone, and leaving APDs in the channel during daylight was likely to get him nothing more than evidence of the increased efficiency of Jap bombers. Even at night:—

There had been some suspicious-looking smokes going up from Savo Island and it seemed not impossible the Japs were occupying the place, at least with a coast-watcher station. Some of the officers persuaded Gen Vandegrift to send two companies of Raiders over for a "reconnaissance in force," a type of operation not much favored either by the General himself or by his operations department. (They considered a reconnaissance in force either too little or too much—the latter if information was desired, the former if the objective were to strike a blow.) The result bore out their dislike; the smokes came from the cook-fires of apologetic natives who offered to do their cooking at 1100 in the morning to avoid future misunderstandings.

But after the Raiders had been brought home, two more of the APDs, *Gregory* and *Little*, were left in the channel on the night of September 4. They took up patrol stations off Lunga Point.

About 0100 they heard a crash of guns to the eastward, and pips developed from that direction on their radar screens. At almost the same moment the pilot of a night-prowling PBY had the brilliant thought that there must be a Jap submarine out there. He dropped a row of five flares, which admirably silhouetted the two little APDs for the Jap cruiser *Yubari* and a pair of heavy enemy destroyers which, having just landed some men near Taivu, came tearing past at 25 knots, searchlights on our unfortunate ships and every gun bearing. Both APDs were sunk in less than ten minutes and there were few survivors, since the Japs machine-gunned the men in the water.

This could be counted a failure in scouting (at Savo), or in liaison (the PBY man should have known), or just in the brain of the PBY man. The point that Adm Turner saw was that two more APDs were gone, and when Gen Vandegrift wanted to use the rest for channel operations, the naval man was inclined to balk. There was an argument, which Gen Vandegrift won as for the use of the APDs, but with the specification that they were to be employed for a single day and under careful air cover, so that instead of an encirclement, the expedition was set up as a straight raid, with a landing beyond the easternmost point the Japs were known to occupy. It went in at dawn on 8 September, with the APDs firing on Tasimboko Village and the handful of Army P-40s giving close support, a job for which these planes had shown themselves peculiarly adapted. Col Edson's men

reached the beach without opposition and worked westward along the shore till they came to a stream, the Kema, which spreads out into a marshy lagoon parallel to the beach. Here were Japs; they began shooting inaccurately from some field guns but a private in Co B put a stop to that by picking off the whole crew of the most annoying piece with his rifle.

Meanwhile another company had worked through the jungle to the south of Tasimboko Village. Just before noon the Raiders closed on the place in a rush from both directions, chased the remaining Japs into the jungle and killed those who delayed in getting away, to the number of 25. The place turned out to be an artillery depot and supply dump—ammunition, food, medical supplies and equipment for a whole brigade; flame throwers, land mines, anti-aircraft guns and a whole battery of artillery. Edson's men blew up and burned everything and got away with only two casualties, after one of the most brilliant little operations of the war.

It had an effect too. "It is maddening," wrote one of the Japs in his diary, "to be the recipients of these insulting attacks by American forces." Another: "Oh! All this is terrifying; I am surprised." Gen Kawaguchi set it down that our troops had occupied Tasimboko and angrily redrew his plan of attack to allow for the loss of the battery Edson's men had blown up. It had been intended that his three attacks should be simultaneous with the artillery covering all at once. Now the attack of the battalion behind the Tenaru was to be delayed till it could receive the support of all the guns, which by this time would have blasted a path through the American defenses south of the airfield. It does not seem to have occurred to the general that he had lost the secrecy which was so much of an element in his original plan, but if it had it would never have done to admit it since other elements of the Imperial Forces were already involved. Adm Mikawa's cruisers with a pair of destroyers ran into the lagoon and shelled the American lines. The 25th Air Flotilla had now been built up by the planes originally intended for the 3rd Fleet and both on the 11th and 12th it was possible to send down as many as 26 bombers with the elaborate cover of 30 Zeroes. They reported they had done great damage to the American positions.

THE stepping up of air operations, the nightly visits of Japanese ships, the fact that patrols to the east now almost invariably clashed with the enemy—all pointed in one direction, an imminent attack. Edson's raid had confirmed the reports of native scouts (not quite believed at the time) that there were three or four thousand

of the enemy prowling around back there in the jungle.

Gen Vandegrift believed he could hold against that many but he was far from happy about his position as a whole. The aerial side was the worst; there was a continual drain of casualties from the bombings and on 2 September a plane was hit on the field and blew up with a bad fire and some of the ammunition dumps exploding. Our fighters were getting a steady average of five to one but the Japs always seemed to have another five and by the 11th the fighter strength of the field was practically zero.

The situation to troops was not very good either. In the last couple of weeks there had been an outbreak of malaria that alarmed the medical officers; they had 48 hospitalized cases and among the men untouched by the disease was a good deal of tropical diarrhea, traceable as much as anything else to fatigue. There were not men enough to hold the lines in any case. Thanks to the APDs and air cover which allowed a thin trickle of supply ships to get in (seven during the first month) the men were eating again and ammunition stocks were adequate, but it had seldom been possible to get all the loads off ships before they had to pull out again, so equipment remained short. What was needed was a good big convoy with reinforcements and everything else implied in that word. Gen Vandegrift kept the communications channels hot asking for it—but most especially for planes, at once.

By the night of the 12th that convoy was already on the tide. Adm Turner had made extraordinary efforts to assemble shipping (his major shortage) and had persuaded Ghormley that the 7th Marine Regiment could defend Samoa far more effectively up on the shores of Guadalcanal than where it stood. Now it was aboard and moving up, the carriers *Wasp* and *Hornet* seeing it in. Vandegrift's appeal of the 11th for planes caused a change; next morning the carriers left their intended course and stood up toward the southern shore of the island with 20 fresh Marine fighters aboard.

By that same date the General had made his arrangements to meet the coming storm. The eastern flank position along the Tenaru was strengthened and carried inward from the river's bank. Next to its termination there was a tall nameless ridge where the Raider battalion established and dug into what was more a chain of foxholes than a formal position. At the right rear of this the Pioneers organized a position down to the Lunga; but beyond that stream Grassy Knoll still dominated the whole landscape and there were not enough men to cover it. An attack there would have to be dealt with by a counter stroke from division reserve.

To be continued

a military digest

The Air-Ground Problem

By Col John W. Hansborough, USA

WITH THE FINAL, complete and utter defeat of the Axis powers by the armed might of the Allies we should now coolly calmly, without prejudice, and without bias examine the team which accomplished this victory.

The subject to be examined and discussed is the often maligned problem of air-ground organization and command. Before discussing the problem, we must accept certain principles as self-evident truths.

1. The mission of land power is to close with and destroy the enemy on the ground, to occupy the enemy nation, and to impose the terms of the peace upon the defeated peoples.

2. The mission of air power is to close with and destroy the enemy in the air, to destroy the enemy's economic ability and will to fight, to support by fire power the ground and naval forces, and to provide air transportation for ground forces.

3. The mission of naval power is to close with and destroy the enemy on the sea, to transport ground and air forces by sea, and to support by fire power, within the range of naval guns, the ground forces.

If we accept the above three missions as correct we must then discard paragraph 1 of FM 100-20 dated 21 July 1943. This paragraph states: "Land Power and Air Power are co-equal and interdependent forces: neither is an auxiliary of the other." Actually all forms of power are auxiliary to other forms of power, none is supreme or complete within itself.

Military power, whether developed by naval, ground, or air forces, is personified by fire power. Fire power developed through the use of explosive energy or more recently the use of atomic energy, has the ultimate purpose of facilitating the advance of the infantry, or foot soldier, to and into the enemies' home country. All means of developing fire power must be co-ordinated and integrated so as to accomplish this end.

During the recent war, this coordination and integration was achieved through a system of negotiation between co-equal air and ground commanders. In case of a breakdown in the negotiations the problem had to be presented to the theater commander for decision. In so far

as is known, recourse to the theater commander was seldom, if ever, necessary. It is believed that this was true because of the full understanding by ground commanders of the proper use of air power, and, in those few instances of dispute, the ground commander accepted the air commander's decision rather than upset the fighting team by bickering over rather minor and unessential points. In other words, negotiation was made to work because of the burning desire of all parties to reach one end, the defeat of the enemy.


Now that the necessity for cooperation has been removed the Air Forces and Ground Forces are once again pulling apart. Air Forces are separated from Ground Forces, each is located on his own field or camp, command is centralized only in the War Department, and the bitter argument of "who won the war" is beginning to be heard. The ground soldier is criticizing the sloppy undisciplined air man and the pilot looks down his nose at that poor throw-back to an ancient age, the ground soldier. Such a condition must not be permitted to develop. Command and organization must be so integrated that we have only one team which trains and fights as one. We cannot expect two teams which, in peace, bicker and squabble with each other suddenly to become one in the face of the enemy. A sneering attitude of one service for another cannot be tolerated.

Joint air-ground coordination has been likened to marriage. Certainly the coordination and cooperation of a married couple cannot be increased or extended by a divorce. How can we then expect a better air-ground team through separation of air and ground forces? The answer lies in strengthening the present marriage and not in divorce.

"Nothing is more important in war than unity of command." *Napoleon, Maxim 46.*

"Infantry, cavalry, and artillery cannot do without one another. They should therefore be quartered so as to give mutual aid in case of surprise." *Napoleon, Maxim 47.*

If to the infantry, cavalry, and artillery of Maxim 47 we add "and air forces" we will have brought the maxim up to date. It is on the firm foundation of the above two maxims that the following organization and chain of command is based.



The author does not intend to delve into Navy organization other than to say that the need for naval air and marine units is believed self-evident. Naval air includes not only all carrier and shipborne aircraft, but such units of land based aircraft as are necessary to carry out the assigned naval mission.

In connection with Chart 1, the following should be noted. Ground, service, and air force units may be assigned to any command or major unit of any of the three forces. For instances; engineer battalions may be assigned to air or ground units, tactical air forces may be assigned to Army groups, antiaircraft artillery may be assigned to the air defense command. Overseas commands would be organized in a manner similar to that shown above for the War Department. A theater commander would be designated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff with command of all Army and Navy elements assigned to the theater.

Note in Chart 2 that the tactical air force is an organic part of the Army group. The engineer command is responsible for the construction and maintenance of all air fields used by air units, except liaison squadrons, within the Army group.

In connection with Chart 3 the following points are to be noted:

1. The tactical air command is assigned to the Army.
2. A liaison reconnaissance squadron is assigned to each corps. This squadron, equipped with light aircraft furnished liaison planes for use within the corps and is capable of performing close-in detailed reconnaissance. The corps engineer is responsible for preparation and maintenance of the fields for this squadron.
3. The tactical air command will maintain with each corps and division of the Army an air liaison officer.
4. In addition to providing the tactical control center and the necessary forward director posts (normally one per corps), the tactical control group will provide one forward control team with each corps headquarters and infantry division, and four forward control teams with each armored division of the Army.
5. The Army headquarters will provide ground liaison officers at each group of fighter

aviation, each squadron and group of reconnaissance aviation and with the tactical control center and each forward director post of the tactical air command.

Let us now look back and see if we have violated the maxims on which the organization was based. We must assume that the Army group would establish the tactical air force headquarters with its own headquarters and that the Army commander would keep the tactical air command with his headquarters.




Unity of command has been established throughout. Each commander has the forces necessary to carry out his mission. Considering the employment of fire power, we can now truthfully say:

1. The division commander influences the battle through the fire power of the *division artillery*.
2. The corps commander influences the battle through the fire power of the *corps artillery*.
3. The army commander influences the battle through the fire power of the *tactical air command*.
4. The army group commander influences the battle through the fire power of the *tactical air force*.
5. The commander-in-chief (or theater commander) influences the battle through the fire power of *strategic air forces*.

The only major change from the present organization is the subordination of the tactical air force to the Army group and of the tactical air command to the Army. This will of course, immediately raise the question of flexibility of air power. Actually a review of the organization reveals that flexibility of air power remains the same. Instead of the tactical air force commander issuing orders to the tactical air command commander, the Army group commander issues the orders to the Army commander. Staff contact is maintained between the air commanders in the same manner as now used between corps and division artillery commanders.

If we accept the above organization as proper we must then change paragraph 3 of FM 100-20 dated 21 July 1943. This paragraph states:

"Command of Air Power: The inherent flexibility of air power is its greatest asset. This flexibility make it possible to employ the whole weight of the available air power against selected areas in turn; such concentrated use of the air striking force is a battle winning factor of the first importance. Control of available air power must be centralized and command must be exercised through the air force commander if this inherent flexibility and ability to deliver a decisive blow are to be fully exploited. Therefore, the command of air and ground forces in a theater of operations will be vested in the superior commander charged with the tactical



superior commander charged with the actual conduct of operations in the theater, who will exercise command of air forces through the air force commander and command of ground forces through the ground force commander. The superior commander will not attach army air forces to units of the ground forces under his command except when such ground force units are operating independently or are isolated by distance or lack of communications."

Air forces and ground forces each conduct their own branch and service schools. These schools should be basic and cover all phases of the branch or service concerned and include indoctrination instruction on all associated arms. Selected officers would be sent to the Command and Staff College of the War Department. After graduation from this school the officers should

be qualified to command any unit, not a general officer's command, or to function as a staff officer on any staff.

The Armed Forces War College would be the senior educational institution of the armed forces. It should be conducted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The student body would be composed of selected Army and Navy officers. The graduates of this college would be assigned to the General Staff Corps. From the General Staff Corps would be selected the general officers and admirals and the staff officers for joint Army-Navy staffs.

An understanding of the air man's difficulty is best realized by flying. When every general officer and every regimental and battalion commander has sprouted wings, then we will no longer have an air-ground problem. ★



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Historically Speaking . . .

Capt Jinks' Horse Marines

"I am Captain Jinks of the Horse Marines
I give my horse good corn and beans
Of course it is quite beyond my means
Though I am a Captain in the Army."*

So sang the dance hall girls in gaslit Civil War cabarets and marines have been plagued with parodies ever since. But actually the song-immortalized troopers were marines in practically nothing but name. Most certainly they were no relation to the U. S. Marine Corps mounted detachments which have served variously in China, Mexico, Nicaragua, Santo Domingo, Haiti, and other ports of call.

The Civil War horse marines were a substitute article, improvised because the real thing wasn't available. When RearAdm David D. Porter took over the Mississippi Squadron in October 1862 one of the greatest shortcoming of his river fleet was its inability to cross country. Its operations were limited strictly to navigable waters and weren't always too efficient at that because of high banks, shallow water, and other difficulties including unfriendly gentlemen in grey coats.

Grant and Sherman were driving down from the north with the Army of the West, bent on choking off the Confederacy's most important transportation artery.

To hasten the campaign, Porter requested the Navy Department to assign him a highly mobile striking force of infantry and light artillery—marines would do nicely. Secretary of Navy Gideon Wells regretfully informed Porter that all the marines were busy, guarding navy yards and such, suggested that a force be improvised from army casualties.

LtCol Alfred D. Ellet, USA, then commanding the Mississippi Ram Fleets, was put in charge of the project. The Mississippi River Marine Brigade, which was activated on 7 November 1862, was to consist of one regiment of infantry (1,000 men), four squadrons of cavalry (500 horse), and one battery of light artillery. Seven sumptuous New Orleans packets, quite capable of carrying 9,000 men, were purchased for conversion into transports for the 1,500 man organization.

LtCol Ellet recruited his marines for the most part from hospitalized state militia. Unquestionably, the convalescents included many malingeringers. Replacements were from army organizations, but the brigade remained under naval command for the duration of the campaign which was climaxed by the fall of Vicksburg.

Control of the brigade was shuttled between Grant and Sherman and Porter. Relations with both the Army of the West and the Mississippi Squadron were not always the best. In extenuation for mistakes they offered as excuses the impetuosity of youth and ignorance of military and naval etiquette. With the pride of a small, independent command they believed their work hard and dangerous. Really much of it was routine, preventative rather than combatant. Nevertheless, the horse marines did excellent work and fulfilled their purpose—Adm Porter attests to this—and the hooves of their corn-fed mounts pounded gallantly along the levees and roads bordering the Mississippi until their disbandment in 1864.

US  MC

*From the 1863 song hit, "Ellet's Horse Marines."